1983

# Establishing the Essential Building Blocks for Understanding Collective Behavior

Janet L. Heitgerd
*Eastern Illinois University*

THESIS REPRODUCTION CERTIFICATE

TO: Graduate Degree Candidates who have written formal theses.

SUBJECT: Permission to reproduce theses.

The University Library is receiving a number of requests from other institutions asking permission to reproduce dissertations for inclusion in their library holdings. Although no copyright laws are involved, we feel that professional courtesy demands that permission be obtained from the author before we allow theses to be copied.

Please sign one of the following statements:

Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University has my permission to lend my thesis to a reputable college or university for the purpose of copying it for inclusion in that institution's library or research holdings.

5/26/83

Date | Author

I respectfully request Booth Library of Eastern Illinois University not allow my thesis be reproduced because ______________________________

Date | Author

m

ESTABLISHING THE ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS

FOR UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

(TITLE)

BY

Janet L. Heitgerd

# THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS IN SOCIOLOGY

IN THE GRADUATE SCHOOL, EASTERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY
CHARLESTON, ILLINOIS

1983

YEAR

I HEREBY RECOMMEND THIS THESIS BE ACCEPTED AS FULFILLING
THIS PART OF THE GRADUATE DEGREE CITED ABOVE

19 July 1983
DATE — ADVISER

7/19/83
DATE — COMMITTEE MEMBER

7-19-83
DATE — COMMITTEE MEMBER

7-19-83
DATE — DEPARTMENT CHAIRPERSON

# ESTABLISHING THE ESSENTIAL BUILDING BLOCKS FOR UNDERSTANDING COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Janet L. Heitgerd
Eastern Illinois University, 1983

It has been argued by researchers that collective behavior, as a field of study in sociology, lacks important theoretical and methodological developments. This has resulted in limited empirical knowledge of collective behavior. There exist many inadequacies in our present theoretical development. These include a failure to not only specify a social dimension of collective behavior, but also, to separate cause and effect, and to describe collective behavior. Scholars have argued that in the study of collective behavior, we are lacking sound, theoretical perspectives and definitions of collective behavior, which have resulted in poor and unsystematic observations of phenomena.

As a way of resolving these problems, it has been hypothesized that researchers must pay attention to the elementary features of collective behavior, which are essential for an understanding of collective behavior. These elementary features can provide empirical data on the crowd, *per se*, and include variables such as the physical conditions created by dense aggregates of people, crowd shape, crowd boundaries, and crowd movement.

In sum, this thesis reviews what many argue are the essential elements of collective behavior which have been ignored or not clearly researched, and using two well-known events, attempts to assess whether this is true or not. The two events chosen are the Berkeley Free Speech Movement and Kent State University (May, 1970). In this thesis, the concern focuses on where studies stand in regard to coverage of these events.

An evaluation of these episodes will indicate what we did and what we did well; what needs to be done in the future; and finally what can and cannot be dealt with adequately. If we attended to gathering information of the type suggested in this thesis, would we be better able to empirically evaluate occurrences of collective behavior?

An analysis of Kent State University on May 4, 1970 and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement on October 1-2, 1964, in light of the elementary features of collective behavior, indicates that researchers have a valid argument that we have little theoretical or methodological knowledge pertaining to the crowd. When these events took place, researchers made an inquiry into collective behavior on a level at which general information concerning the crowd and its participants was given. What needs to be done in the future is to bring research to a level at which analysis includes the examination of the crowd as an empirically distinct phenomenon. Two major implications of this research are that: (1) A more comprehensive description of the crowd would be produced, and (2) Such information should help us to account for the occurrences of violence in such episodes. In conclusion, to establish the social properties of collective behavior, future research must consider the elementary features of collective behavior.

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My appreciation goes out to the Department of Sociology, Eastern Illinois University, for not only guiding my interest in sociology, but also for provoking a desire to continue within this academic field and providing me with the background to pursue that interest. Special thanks go to the members of my thesis committee, Dr. Gary Foster, Dr. Robert Whittenbarger, and Dr. Ron Wohlstein, each of whom not only contributed to the following work with excellent critiques, but also encouraged and advised my throughout my progress within the field of sociology. I would like to especially thank Dr. Wohlstein whose considerable knowledge in the area of collective behavior helped me extensively, and also for his professional guidence and friendship.

A special mention should be made of Lisa Riley, whose skill as a typist is only surpassed by her knowledge of the English language, and of Ed Gregory. What can I say Mr. Ed, you're both a gentleman and a scholar.

Finally, my sincerest respect and gratitude go out to my family, especially my parents, Paul and Joan Heitgerd, who have continually supported my endeavors by not only providing financial support but also, more importantly, emotional support for when times get tough.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

# CHAPTER I

# STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

## INTRODUCTION

Collective behavior is a broad field of study in sociology, encompassing many types of events. In fact, Berk (1974:1) notes that "There is a wide disagreement among sociologists about the nature of collective behavior and a considerable debate about whether a distinct type of human activity exists which should be singled out for this special name." Collective behavior also overlaps with many areas of sociology, such as deviance and political sociology. An episode of collective behavior can vary in purpose, duration, degree of violence involved, and the social acceptability that the public assigns to the event. The spectrum of what is called "collective behavior" is wide and ranges from a single, short-lived outburst, to a long-range, organized movement.

## DETERMINING THE THEORETICAL BOUNDARIES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

According to Milgram and Toch (1965:568), "The phenomenon of collective behavior admits of several theoretical foci, and there is no single set of questions that constitute <u>the proper set of questions</u> about the crowd" (emphasis supplied). While numerous theoretical foci do not constitute a problem, the lack of theoretical clarity does cause problems. McPhail (1972:1) argues that during " . . . the past quarter century, there have been repeated pleas for theoretical development and systematic research in collective behavior, [yet]. . . . there have been no appreciable changes in our theoretical approaches to individual and collective behavior sequences since LeBon's publication of The Crowd (1895) and Floyd Allport's response (1924) (cf. Pickens, 1975)."

The lack of theoretical development has resulted in limited empirical knowledge of collective behavior. Since theories present guidelines for research, undeveloped theoretical guides result in little useful knowledge for advancing a field of study. According to McPhail (1972:2), such theoretical development requires an analytical scheme which would " . . . specify what is to be accounted for before advancing, debating, and testing the merits of competing causal variables." He further states that " . . . the causal variables advanced by existing analytical schemes are essentially static variables presumably located inside the individual and allegedly predisposing him to behave" (McPhail, 1972:11). The "why" of what happened in a collective behavior episode cannot be adequately explained until the researcher examines the "what"; e.g., what actually took place in terms of numbers, persons, locations, and movement. These must be fully and accurately explored, which is not done often.

Weller and Quarentelli (1973:665) note that "Social theories are at their weakest in the analysis of some of the most interesting and challenging aspects of contemporary societies, including the social movements and episodic outbursts so salient in recent America" (emphasis supplied). The public and many "experts," including social scientists, persist in viewing and analyzing crowds with inappropriate terminology (e.g., irrational, emotion-laden, violent). Collective behavior phenomena have been analyzed in terms of *ad hoc* theories which may be a result of a continued lack of theoretical ties between collective behavior and general sociological perspectives (Weller and Quarentelli, 1973).

In summary, theoretical perspectives offer guidelines to gathering empirical data about collective behavior phenomena. As McPhail (1972: 12) notes,

> The theoretical inadequacies of existing analytical schemes have created the methodological problems in obtaining systematic knowledge of individual and collective behavior sequences. Resolving the problems of what to look for, and where, are steps in the direction of achieving a useful analytic scheme.

## RELATED THEORETICAL ISSUES

Failure to Specify a Social Dimension of Collective Behavior. Another barrier to the development of a fully sociological theory of collective behavior, as indicated by Weller and Quarentelli (1973), is the failure to identify the social properties of collective behavior. Weller and Quarentelli (1973:672) state that "Most sociological treatments of collective behavior have been sidetracked from preceding to define their initial problem as one requiring conceptual elaboration at a social level." When referring to an event as an incident of collective behavior, we are assuming there are two or more participants within a certain area engaged in a similar activity and that their behavior is obviously collective.

Milgram and Toch (1965:507) define collective behavior, in part, as " . . . group behavior . . . which depends on interstimulation among participants." By studying only the characteristics of the individual participants in the event, we may be losing a deeper and more comprehensive understanding of what happened. An empirical study at the individual level should not result in neglecting the social aspects inherent in collective behavior.

Failure to Separate Cause and Effect. Fundamental to the relationship between explananda and explanantia " . . . are explicit definitional criteria for both classes of phenomena . . . investigators must delimit beforehand what will or will not constitute a change in each" (Pickens, 1975:60). McPhail (1972:12) finds that "Existing schemes have confused the behavioral phenomena to be accounted for with the causal variables advanced to explain those phenomena." Further specification is required of what, when, or how, whose behaviors are collective (McPhail, 1972). This brings up the point of methodological issues in collective behavior as particularly related to the theoretical and definitional problems. A comprehensive and well-thought-out theory requires variables that are clearly defined. A lack of clarity in the definitions of concepts and variables fails to direct the investigators' search. Therefore, in studying collective behavior, we must advance further specific categories of observable behavior.

Failure to Describe Collective Behavior. Fisher (1972) notes that collective behavior is often treated by sociologists as a residual category which, with a few notable exceptions, provides frameworks in which to study collective behavior, but these proponents fail to carry through in any systematic way a detailed description and analysis of those groups which lie at the heart of collective behavior--that is, crowds. Milgram and Toch (1965) argue that a good way of classifying crowds cannot be decided on in the absence of a good theory of crowds, and no taxonomy seems fully adequate to the task of naming all crowd phenomena. An examination of the development of schemes which classify types of crowds reveals a general failure to consider explananda independent of explanantia (Pickens, 1975). A question that can be raised is: Do crowds exhibit certain features or similarities independent of their purpose or setting. Many social scientists (cf. McPhail, 1972; Milgram and Toch, 1965; Weller and Quarentelli, 1973) advocate studying crowds, per se, rather than the characteristics of the participants. As Milgram and Toch (1965:518) emphasize, "Typically the crowd has not been what has been studied but where things have been studied." McPhail (1972:3) notes that one of the failures of existing analytic schemes is that minimal attention is paid " . . . to what people do with and in relationship to one another.

Pickens (1975:25) refers to theorists, such as Blumer, who have argued that (1) the crowd in collective behavior " . . . occurs when unusual circumstances are in evidence" and (2) " . . . individuals in crowds negotiate their circumstances in ways not typical in operation." In response, Pickens (1975) argues that those statements may be quite true but do not define the crowd. "The crowd must be defined or characterized in its own right independent of alledged causes . . . [but] collective behavior lacks an established terminology with which to differentiate, define, and identify its objects of investigation" (Pickens, 1975:25). It is not enough to explain the purpose of the crowd (why it has gathered), but one should also pay attention to the actions of the group. McPhail (1972:4) reiterates this concern when he argues that "existing schemes have provided no criteria in terms of which an observer can know and record the existence, continuation, or termination of the 'crowd'." It is further stated that " . . . substantive content directs attention to the unique and idiosyncratic features of events, [but this] information . . . hardly provides the basis for establishing the recurrent and universal behavior pattern for which a general theory of individual and collective behavior must account" (McPhail, 1972:4).

Fisher (1972) points out that a characteristic of incidents of collective behavior is that reports are confused and fragmented, and attempts to explain collective behavior with the aid of academically imposed categories have resulted in the view of crowds as that of undifferentiated entities under the sway of pervasive forces. The description of crowds, from which theory proceeds, is based on reports of human observers, and while a fully articulated theory linking the variables of macroscopic analyses has not been proposed, characteristics of the crowd at this level may suggest important regularities (Milgram and Toch, 1965). An individual in conjunction with a group level of analysis may provide insight into previously misunderstood collective behavior phenomena. According to McPhail (1972:2):

> Incisive observation presupposes a set of instructions specifying the phenomena to be observed. Fruitful hypotheses presuppose statements of relationships which are amenable to empirical scrutiny and which can be demonstrated to produce, alter, and terminate the phenomena under examination. Existing analytic schemes have failed to meet these criteria.

Berk (1972:113) argues that

> The problem with the controversy surrounding crowd behavior is that coupled with the intense motivation is the lack of good data on many crucial aspects of the phenomena--a situation which too frequently finds researchers taking long, speculative leaps from their data.

An episode of collective behavior may be of such a short duration that the researcher will not be prepared to study it or will rely on secondary or after-the-fact interviews. This can lead to the failure of adequately dealing with the social-level theory and data. This failure may not be limited to the short-duration episode but can be equally applied to the organized social movements which can have a longer time span. For example, metaphors have been used as an introduction into the analysis of ideas that are not explicitly examined (Berk, 1972).

Summary. To reiterate, the referents for the term "collective behavior," *per se*, have never been clearly specified (McPhail, 1972). Although discussions of crowd taxonomies " . . . make reference to the issue of behavior as a distinguishing criterion for crowds, none provide [sic] a detailed specification for such" (Pickens, 1975:57). Thus, in the study of collective behavior, we are lacking sound, theoretical perspectives and definitions of collective behavior, which has resulted in poor and unsystematic observations of phenomena.

THESIS PROBLEM

What is necessary for accurate descriptions of phenomena to be explained and what is necessary for that explanation besides description? Milgram and Toch (1965:515) argue that "A detailed theory is needed that can spell out what kinds of crowd transformation are possible and what kinds are not possible; which changes in crowd form and mood are reversible and which cannot go back to the starting state." To accomplish this requires attention to numerous variables previously ignored in traditional theorizing about collective behavior.

In addition, it has typically been the individual coming to the crowd and the aggregate results that have been the unit(s) of analysis. It is presently argued that this results in a gap which hinders an investigation and understanding of the phenomena of collective behavior. McPhail (1972:4) notes, "Our concern should [focus on] . . . the formal and recurrent behavior sequences which are observable wherever human beings are co-present . . . . " This involves not only the mundane activities of human behavior, but also the more media attention-getting events such as riots and student protests. Along these lines, Fisher (1972:189) argues that " . . . an understanding of the complexities of crowds rests upon an examination of those aspects which are out of awareness or 'not worth the telling'." What some have thought to be "not worth the telling," I will argue is exactly what are essential building blocks for pursuing an understanding of collective behavior.

The task of this thesis is to review two major episodes of collective behavior in light of this understanding. It is acknowledged that these episodes have been defined as incidents of collective behavior largely by the body of works which have been criticized. This thesis is concerned not so much with whether one can actually define these episodes as collective behavior, but more so with an evaluation of the studies which pertain to these events. Specifically, I propose to examine what the studies actually looked at, what do students of collective behavior know as a result of these works, and finally, what is left unknown. An investigation of the literature will allow one to judge whether the stated criticisms actually reflect our lack of information concerning the elementary features of collective behavior. In so doing, it will be noted whether or not these elementary features of collective behavior have been attended to. If the literature indicates that these features have been attended to, the concern of this research will shift to the degree of accuracy regarding these dimensions which includes how consistent in the literature are the subjective and empirical interpretations. If these elementary features have been ignored, the question of whether or not such information could have been gathered arises, and if so, whether it would allow researchers to answer the important questions raised about such phenomena or not.

In sum, this thesis problem is to review what many have argued are the essential elements of collective behavior which have been ignored or not clearly researched and to assess, using two well-known events, whether this was true or not concerning these events. If such elementary features have been ignored, could they have been studied, and if so, what would have been the outcome in terms of the episodes themselves and in terms of future empirical research?

## OUTLINE OF THESIS

In this chapter, many of the problems involved in the study of collective behavior have been dealt with. It has been suggested that theoretical attention to the elementary features of collective behavior would provide what is necessary to understand and explain such phenomena. Chapter Two will deal with those features which can be examined to obtain useful information regarding collective behavior. It will also spell out some specific variables that should be considered when theorizing about the empirical study of crowds. Chapters Three and Four involve the utilization of these features and variables to assess the state of the literature regarding two major events of collective behavior: Kent State, 1970, and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, 1964. A summary of the intentions of this thesis, what was done, the results, and finally, an assessment and suggestions for future research regarding collective behavior will be presented in Chapter Five.

## CHAPTER II

## THE ELEMENTARY FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

### INTRODUCTION

To understand the phenomena of collective behavior, a researcher must review the elementary features of the crowd. This concerns the theoretical notion of dividing up long-term crowd phenomena into beginnings, middles, and endings.[1] Thus, collective behavior must be viewed as process not just outcome. The emphasis of this thesis is on what actually goes on during the middle stage. The elementary features of collective behavior, which will be discussed, pertain mainly to the middle stage. It is argued that this stage is least empirically researched or understood by students of collective behavior. Many of the measurement techniques (e.g., survey research and gathering information on demographic characteristics) currently used to study episodes of collective behavior are aimed at obtaining information concerning conditions preceding and resulting from crowd behavior (Berk, 1972). Berk (1972:114) notes that this " . . . results in analyses of crowds that can best examine input and output but little in between." Therefore, what is lacking is essential empirical data on crowd behavior, _per se_. In this chapter, I will try to emphasize those "in between" areas to which we

---

[1]Concerning the criteria for judgement of beginnings, middles, and endings, McPhail (1972) also cites deficiencies in both beginnings and endings, respectively, the formation and dispersal of the crowd. In this thesis, the middle stage, i.e., crowd activity, _per se_, encompasses formation and dispersal.

should pay more attention. The distortion of facts can be common throughout a research process. Berk (1972) has noted that in many instances, the participants may be too involved to give accurate descriptions of their behavior, there is memory failure, or the participants may be hostile to the researcher. A researcher should be better able to understand and explain collective behavior by attending to the following areas of concern regarding what goes on during episodes of these phenomena.

## CROWD CHARACTERISTICS

Leadership. Milgram and Toch (1965) find that one theoretical issue implicit in crowd activity is that of the role of leadership. One can begin with the question of what role and function does or can the leader play. Also, how does a person or persons come to be recognized by the crowd as the leader? Does the leadership change or vary according to the tactics of the crowd, and consequently, how is their support generated? McCarthy and Zald (1973) stress the increasing professionalization of leadership in social movements. This professionalization allows for the greater allocation of resources to the movement, thereby allowing it to gain more influence. It is stressed here that an overt leader which can be readily identified by the media may only be a figurehead. Using observation and participant input, a researcher may be able to identify a more influential leader (cf. Moreno, 1934).

In the case of a short-lived outburst of collective behavior, how, if at all, is a leader or group of leaders acknowledged? In addition, how is the leader(s) acknowledged and/or what constitutes recognition of leadership by participants? This can be an important question, due to incidents of violence involved in some episodes of collective behavior. The degree of influence generated by the leader(s) toward the participants and activities of the crowd is a crucial issue. By identifying both the formal and, if possible, informal leader(s) in an episode of collective behavior, one may better understand the tactics of the crowds as a whole.

Physical Conditions Created By Dense Aggregates of People. Milgram and Toch (1965:516) note, "The human body, by virtue of its size, shape, and physical extension in space comes to play a determining role in crowds . . . a comprehensive theory of crowds must take into account, in a systematic rather than a metaphoric fashion, the role played by the physical conditions created by dense aggregates of people." No matter how many people are reported by various sources, there is a limit to the amount of people per unit of space. A question that can be raised is: How does the density of persons in an event affect the reaction to and among the crowd? The texture of the core of a crowd depends, in part, upon its density and the arrangement of the bodies of the participants (Fisher, 1972). Density may also affect the perceptions of the participants and the agents of social control. The stimuli generated by a high density situation can result in a seemingly more threatening environment to those involved. Very little physical space per person inhibits movement and may present itself to those involved as a partial loss of control regarding their own actions. A high density situation entails that any movement by a person will be tied to others around them. It is no longer action by a single person independent of others, but also includes the reactions it generates by being physically close to others. The major point, as it applies here, is that without attending to density, researchers may be overlooking a possibly important causal factor in accounting for the outgrowth of violence. Relatedly, this factor may then help us in our prediction of incidents of collective behavior.

Crowd Shape. Macroscopic properties of the crowd have considerable theoretical and practical importance (Milgram and Toch, 1965). Milgram and Toch (1965:518) state that "Pending the availability of systematic data, the observer in crowds is limited to a few rough generalizations about basic crowd structures and their functions." It is suggested here that more specific detail is required in terms of feedback between participants, and between participants and the agents of social control. This feedback may be vocal and/or nonvocal (e.g., gestures, gaze orientations) and is something students of collective behavior need to pay attention to. Although this type of coverbal communication has been extensively used in other areas of sociology, it has not been utilized very effectively in collective behavior. One consequence of paying attention to feedback involves the dissemination of information, for example, whether the spread of information is facilitated or hindered by a circular crowd which is focused on a single speaker, or a more rectangular crowd as is characteristic of marches, or crowds separated by a street (e.g., watching a march or a parade). It may be interesting to note which of these types have been more prone to outbreaks of violence and why this is so. Factors (i.e. crowd shape and its impact on communication), in addition to the content of the events, may give rise to a more hostile environment.

It has been suggested that the best way to view the overall structure of a crowd is from directly overhead (Milgram and Toch, 1965). Milgram and Toch (1965:518) further argue that "If individuals are randomly distributed over a flat surface in the starting situation, a point of common interest in the same plane creates a crowd tending toward circularity . . . [which] permits the most efficient arrangement of individuals around a common point of focus." But, it is not inherent that crowds focusing on a single speaker or event will be consistently circular. Other variables must be taken into consideration before one assumes that the above statement is correct. Numerous variables such as the physical setting of the situation, the speaker's platform, the number of people in the crowd, and the PA system will all serve to temper the supposed circularity of a crowd focused on a single speaker or event. The situational facilities have important consequences for the shape or form the crowd takes. This then has important implications for the characteristics and maintenance of the boundary of the crowd.

Crowd Boundaries. Fisher (1972:192) argues that in episodes of collective behavior, " . . . crowds exhibit graduated but distinct edges." This also affects the degree of involvement of the participants. Those at the edge of the crowd, it has been proposed, are more or less onlookers. It has been hypothesized that those who are most intensely motivated to carry out the crowd's purpose will be disproportionally represented at the crowd's structural core (Milgram and Toch, 1965; Meyer and Seidler, 1978). While this may, in part, be true, it is also plausible to suggest that not only motivation but timing of the event can serve to determine the location of persons. It is a reasonable idea that those more motivated will be at the core, but also, many highly motivated persons may be scattered throughout the crowd because they arrived at a later time. In sum, the timing of an assembly may function to determine the location of people, whether at the core, inner fringe, or outer fringe, in addition to, or in spite of, motivation. Milgram and Toch (1965:520) indicate, "The dimensions of inner space are related to a number of variables, such as the degree of attraction or repulsion to the speaker, his elevation, the size of the ring, and the pressure from those in the rear."

The boundary of crowds is related to its shape. According to Milgram and Toch (1965), a boundary defines the limit or extent of the crowd and is characterized by permeability and sharpness. Fisher (1972) finds that two factors are involved in permeability: (1) the physical proximity of the persons composing the boundary and (2) the expectation of the person who may want to cross it (Fisher, 1972:193). The more dense a crowd is, the more likely it will be that an outsider would hesitate to infiltrate the crowd; whereas at the fringe of the crowd, the density tends to be much lower which facilitates increasingly possible movement by a spectator or another participant (Fisher, 1972). The measurement of the sharpness of a boundary is not always easy to deduce empirically (Milgram and Toch, 1965). It has been suggested that the degree of interpenetration of two boundaries can be specified by applying a grid over the photographs taken at different phases of a riot and determining how many squares are mixed and how many contain unmixed elements (Milgram and Toch, 1965). While the boundary of a crowd may not always be distinctive, the empirical study of polarization constitutes the best single measure of crowd boundary (Milgram and Toch, 1965). But Milgram and Toch (1965) also emphasize that it is anybody's guess what polarization value defines the exact boundary of the crowd. It is important to understand the boundaries in collective behavior because the clash of two hostile groups, as is common in episodes of collective behavior, is largely a boundary confrontation (Milgram and Toch, 1965). The importance of this should be noted in regard to understanding violence between agents of social control and participants. The violation of a boundary in a hostile environment can be seen as a severe threat to the crowd. Therefore, the invasion of either group into the other's "area" constitutes a boundary confrontation and consequently it is conducive to an outbreak of violence. Boundaries exert a more complex limit on the observer who must interpret the permeability of a boundary, and his access is tempered by his interpretation (Fisher, 1972). This can be of considerable importance to agents of social control in events of collective behavior.

Individuals or Groups in Collective Behavior. There has been debate on whether individuals or groups make up a crowd. Milgram and Toch (1965: 523) note, "Most crowds cannot be thought of as an aggregate of isolated points, since a fair proportion of the participants are likely to have specifiable kinship or friendship ties to one or more participants in the assemblage." Again, one finds an emphasis on social-level data. Perry and Pugh (1978:23) support this when they argue that "As a form of group action, collective behavior is not reducible to psychological propositions about individuals acting in isolation from other people." It seems apparent that people will attend a gathering with other people they knew previously, and " . . . role relationships constitute substructures and govern the participants to a greater degree than is ordinarily supposed" (Milgram and Toch, 1965:523). This is supported by Aveni (1977) in a study of an assemblage of persons. The data indicate that a majority of persons came with at least one other person and also, sixty-four percent stated that " . . . they saw or met others they recognized or knew" (Aveni, 1977:98). The implications of this, as recognized by Aveni (1977), is that the crowd must be studied on two levels, an individual level and also a structural or group level. Those at the core of the crowd can have a relationship with other motivated participants by virtue of their concern *a priori* to the event, or as a result of the event, in that a shared concern results in the creation of an episodic relationship.

*Crowd Size*. This brings up the topic of estimating crowd size. Jacobs, in 1967, estimated the highest density that a crowd could achieve and pointed out that by applying his formula, official estimates of crowd attendance can often be exaggerated. Pickens (1975) finds that an indication of the lack of concern with *explananda* is centered on the issue of an aggregate size; that there exists no consensus on what number is required for a crowd to be a crowd. When we have two people engaged in a similar activity within a specified area, we can say their behavior is collective but we would hardly call it a crowd. Besides the number of persons, what distinctions exist, if any, between a small gathering and a large group or assemblage? What are the criteria for a small gathering versus a large group, besides the opinion of the observer. Milgram and Toch (1965:534) indicate, "The theoretical significance of numbers for the phenomena of collective behavior is subject to dispute" but they also argue " . . . surely certain crowd phenomena depend for their expression on large numbers." More importantly is the question: "At what size do all the essential features of a large crowd appear?" (Milgram and Toch, 1965:534).

Berk (1972) has found that crowd behavior is often characterized as implicitly irrational and/or a mysterious phenomenon where the individual is caught up and lost. There is an assumption that people in crowds tend to be motivated by the same interests or that they are nearly identical in other ways (Berk, 1972). This idea had its start with LeBon in 1895, and in all these years, not much has changed in the characterization of crowds. The assumptions pertaining to crowds, so far, have had no empirical base. Milgram and Toch (1965:535) note that "One of the factors presumed to emerge in crowds of sufficiently large size is anonymity." Yet Berk (1972) argues, "What happens to people in crowds is an empirical question on which we have little information, and into this factual vacuum are drawn a variety of speculations . . . . " This, I believe, reinforces my position that we know little about what goes on in the crowd itself.

The movements and actions of the crowd may have a great deal of regularity, which suggests something other than irrationality and anonymity. The findings of social scientists (cf. Aveni, 1977; Milgram and Toch, 1965; Perry and Pugh, 1978), as suggested earlier in this chapter, indicate that the participants in events of collective behavior do exhibit degrees of familiarity and role relationships with each other. Therefore, can we just assume that this stops when the crowd is formed, and again, when is a crowd a crowd? Milgram and Toch (1965:568) question the idea of collective response from a crowd when they state, "When wholly contradictory assertations are supported by the crowd, we must ask whether the same individuals in the crowd are responding." Different subgroups within the crowd may respond to different statements, and this represents just a normal spread of opinion in a group (Milgram and Toch, 1965). Researchers must not assume that the crowd as a whole is responding in the same manner without identifying subgroups, if any, and their reactions. These are areas which must be given attention in collective behavior in a systematic and empirical fashion.

Participant Characteristics. Another area that calls for attention is the characteristics of participants. Milgram and Toch (1965:537) find that "The composition of crowds is functionally related to the actions of crowds, and the precise makeup of a crowd may play a very important role in determining the form of collective behavior that arises." Obviously, a riot by the Hell's Angels will take a different form than a demonstration by mothers against nuclear arms, although both are forms of collective behavior. But in many instances, such as college-student demonstrations, the differences may be negligible. Fisher (1972:200) argues that " . . . the simple issue of who participated is problematic . . . this imprecision of description can be traced to objective features that account for the confusion and irremediable subjectivity of the reports." It should be mentioned that " . . . beliefs, attitudes, values, personality orientations and other such predispositions or tendencies to behave are not directly observable . . . [but] they may be inferred from behavior other than those they are supposed to explain" (McPhail, 1972:11). McPhail (1972:11) further states, "Measures of attitudes and personality . . . as well as socioeconomic and demographic attributes have yielded consistently low correlations with behavior." In terms of episodes of collective behavior, " . . . there is no substitute for the direct observation and measurement of authentic crowd behavior" (Milgram and Toch, 1965:584), although this may be supplemented with indirect observation, such as surveys and questionnaires, with good results.

Crowd Movement. Crowd behavior involves the motion and collective locomotion of participants. McPhail (1972:3) notes that " . . . almost no attention has been given to the formation and dispersal of [crowds or collections of people] nor to their distribution across time and space." This information is important for the control of crowds and better preparation for the studying of crowds. This will aid researchers in knowing where and what to look for. Researchers must give a considerable amount of attention to formal and recurrent sequences of individual behavior (McPhail, 1972). In terms of assemblages, which cannot be taken for granted, we must account for the movement of persons from their disparate locations in one space and time to a common location in another space and time (McPhail, 1972). This patterned sequence provides useful information on the event itself by pinpointing specific actions rather than generalizing about the actions of the crowd as a whole. Which individual or groups of individuals moved where? Where did the more active participants move to? What about the fringe members or onlookers? Events of collective behavior, according to Fisher (1972:188) " . . . are painted in terms of grossly defined, descriptive categories which neither distinguish subtle variations nor give hints of the manifold ways in which crowds are assembled." McPhail (1972: 6) notes that " . . . irrespective of the distance, mode, speed or frequency of movement, assemblages are formed when the direction of the persons' physical movements converge on a common time-space location." The same can be said of dispersal, but the action " . . . is an alteration in the direction of body movement of co-present persons away from a common time-space location" (McPhail, 1972:10). Therefore, McPhail (1972) argues that attention be given to the actual phenomenon of collective behavior, itself, irrespective of the qualities of participants; in McPhail's (1972: 6) words, "Given an assemblage of persons, what behavior must occur, when, and by whom to constitute collective behavior?" This will involve focusing on other behavioral alignments.

SUMMARY

The preceding paragraphs contain the elements researchers need to pay attention to in the study of collective behavior. Many authors (cf. Berk, 1972; Fisher, 1972; McPhail, 1972; McPhail and Wohlstein, 1982; Milgram and Toch, 1965; Pickens, 1975; Wohlstein, 1977) have advanced strategies to deal with the observation of these elements. These include projective devices; team reporting; the reduction of the observer-to-observed ratio; survey research; identifying and describing recurrent behavior patterns by means of direct observation in "natural settings" and then manipulating these under experimental conditions; systematic description; and participant behavior reports.

Milgram and Toch (1965:584) state, "The most important need is to get the main questions off the debating rostrum and move them to a level at which measurement, controlled observation, and imaginative experiments can begin to play some part in choosing among competing views."

In light of the theoretical and methodological issues I have covered, I propose to examine the Berkeley Free Speech Movement and Kent State (May, 1970) to establish what we can learn from past efforts. These two events drew unprecedented attention by social scientists. Many books and articles have been published, resulting from these research efforts. Also, these two events, as student protests, generally reflect a part of the substance of collective behavior. The events which took place at Kent State University are a series of episodes of collective behavior which happened in a four day period. Social movements, such as the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, are forms of collective behavior which best fit the criterion of aiming at change in the world and least qualify as amorphous or unorganized. Therefore, this event should be covered most systematically.

These two events are chosen as a starting point in which to evaluate previous efforts to analyze events of collective behavior. In this thesis, the concern focuses on where studies stand in regard to coverage of events. In previous sections, I have criticized what past research efforts have focused their attention on; the next chapters will be a critique of the coverage. Are the previously made criticisms actually warranted? An evaluation of these events will indicate what we did and what we did well; what needs to be done in the future; and finally, what can and cannot be dealt with adequately. Is the debate on collective behavior accurately reflecting the present state of affairs? How far is the ideal from the real? In sum, if we attended to gathering information of the type suggested in this review, would we be better able to empirically evaluate the occurrences of collective behavior? Along with this evaluation is the issue of prediction. A thorough knowledge and understanding of the aforementioned features may enable researchers to explain what occurred and why it occurred. Within time, it may also aid us in coming to conclusions concerning whether, if a number of these features are present in a given situation, a certain outcome will result. This information is of particular importance when incidents of collective behavior result in violence. An analysis along the lines suggested by scholars in this area may provide the necessary information to answer crucial questions regarding collective behavior.

# CHAPTER III

# AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ELEMENTARY FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR: THE KENT STATE EPISODE

## INTRODUCTION

On May 4, 1970, Kent State University received extensive attention as a media event. Joseph Kelner, chief counsel for the 13 victims, had to go through 60 cartons of information in order to prepare his court case for what he states as "The most documented homicides in American History" (Kelner and Munves, 1980:18). On this date, a major episode of collective behavior occurred at Kent State University. The general approach used to examine this event will focus on answering the question: What information, if any, has been obtained by researchers from this episode that pertains to the elementary features of collective behavior presented in Chapter II, and concurrently, how did they go about it? In this chapter, I will provide a brief summary of the events of the first few days in May, 1970, with particular attention to the date of May 4. I will also review the major literature that examined this event at Kent State University (e.g., what was looked at; how the information was obtained; when were interviews granted). Finally, and most importantly, special consideration will be given to those elements of collective behavior that researchers (e.g., McPhail, 1972; Milgram and Toch, 1965; Pickens, 1975) argue should be our main concern.

The approach that I will take in this chapter, in regard to the event of May 4 at Kent State University and in the next chapter on the Berkeley

Free Speech Movement, will examine three areas: (1) the origins or background of the major incidents; (2) behaviors within the event itself; and (3) the outcome(s) of the event. By this evaluation, I hope to determine the strengths and weaknesses of these accounts and whether or not additional information of the type suggested could have been gathered. If so, would it enhance our understanding of these events. A superficial and/or weak account of the events would suggest that we must turn our attention to the elementary features of collective behavior that have been offered within this paper. Also, any discrepencies which exist regarding what occurred at these events would indicate that a shift of focus of concern is needed in our evaluations of events of collective behavior. Finally, if these features have been attended to in the literature, the question arises of how well.

For the purpose of this paper, a brief consideration of the events of May 1-3 (the background and participants) will comprise the origins of May 4, which is my most immediate concern. An analysis of activities within the event itself will only concentrate on the riot of May 4, as will an examination of the outcome. Obviously, the outcome of May 4 is not isolated from the events of May 1-3.

BACKGROUND TO MAY 4, 1970

Kent State University is located near the city of Kent, Ohio, which has a population of approximately 30,000. In 1970, the campus itself had a population of approximately 21,000. As of 1970, Kent State University was one of the 25 largest universities in the U.S., situated on more than 600 acres of land (Best, 1981). Demonstrations or rallies by the students before this time were relatively unknown. An incident on April 8, 1969, between campus police and students which subsequently led to the arrest and suspension of four students, set a pattern for the university's handling of demonstrations (Best, 1981). Another incident that should be mentioned before proceeding to the events of the first few days in May, 1970, is described by Best (1981:32) as follows: " . . . on April 30, President Nixon ordered U.S. and South Vietnamese troops to invade Cambodia, further widening the scope of the conflict [between the students and Nixon administration]."

On Friday, May 1, a few incidents happened that set the tone for the next three days. According to Best (1981:33), "In response to the invasion of Cambodia, a group of History graduate students--World Historians Opposed to Racism and Exploitation (WHORE)--quickly organized a protest demonstration for noon at the Victory Bell on the Commons." According to reports (i.e., Best, 1981; Scranton Commission Report, 1970), approximately 500 students attended this rally. At the conclusion of this rally, another one was called for Monday, noon, with the intention of discussing " . . . attitudes of the university administration toward the Cambodia incursion and toward other student demands, including the abolition of the ROTC Program" (Scranton Commission Report, 1970:240).

A 45-minute rally was held at 3 p.m. by the Black United Students (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). The discussion centered around recent campus disturbances and drew approximately 400 persons (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). On the basis of these two peaceful rallies, President White of Kent State University left for Iowa for the weekend. As stated in the Scranton Commission Report (1970:240), "He did not return to Kent until noon Sunday, after the city and campus had experienced two nights of turmoil."

That night, a disturbance by the students around the bars on North Water Street caused what was originally estimated to be $10,000 of property damage and seriously disrupted traffic. As the Scranton Commission Report (1970:241) indicated, "The crowd grew increasingly boisterous . . . . [also] some of the crowd, which had grown to about 500, started a bonfire in the street." At about 12:30 a.m., Mayor Satrom, of Kent Ohio, declared a state of emergency, which Best (1981:36) describes as a strategic mistake. Mayor Satrom also ordered all the bars closed and established an 11 p.m. curfew for the city and a 1 a.m. curfew for the campus (Best, 1981). Between 1 and 2 a.m., 15 Kent City police and 15 Portage County deputies moved the student crowd back to the campus by using tear gas (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). Rumors that the Kent State 4 were behind this night's events were never substantiated. The Kent State 4 were students who had been arrested in 1969, following a skirmish with the campus police. The situation leading to this arrest arose when six persons, including these four students, attempted to post a list of demands (e.g., abolition of the ROTC Program on campus and removal of a state criminal investigation laboratory from campus) at the administration building (Best, 1981). The four students involved not only were arrested but were also suspended from school. The Kent State 4 were affiliated with the Kent State SDS (Students for a Democratic Society) chapter.

The rumors about Friday night's events were abundant on Saturday, May 2, and had a great deal of impact on the action taken that day. In the morning, according to the Scranton Commission Report (1970:244), Mayor Satrom " . . . banned the sale of liquor and beer, firearms and gasoline unless pumped directly into the tank of a car." A curfew was set for the period between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. in the city of Kent, Ohio, and between 1 and 6 a.m. on the campus. It should also be noted that there were no injunctions on any rallies (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). Because of the rumors, a rumor control center and emergency operations center were established which " . . . would be the administration's command post for the remainder of the weekend" (Best, 1981:41). This was the first day that the National Guard was officially called into Kent, Ohio, but it was after the students had burned the ROTC building. It should be pointed out that the concept of the National Guard's presence during this time would be for them to assume control over the city and university (Best, 1981). The Scranton Commission Report (1970:248) indicates that at 7:30 p.m., a crowd assembled on the Commons near the Victory Bell; then the crowd moved to the dormitories, picking up new members; and "By the time they headed back toward the Commons, the crowd had grown to around 1,000." Best (1981) reports that, initially, around 7:30 p.m., there were about 600 students and when they were back on the Commons, the number was between 1,000 and 2,000. The ROTC building was on fire at approximately 8:45 p.m. Best (1981:46) noted that from 10 to 12 p.m., " . . . the Guard cleared the campus, using tear gas . . . . "

On Sunday, May 3, President White returned and Governor Rhodes entered the scene. Governor Rhodes alluded to the idea that the previous days' events on Kent State University were led by radical students and non-students who were " . . . worse than the brownshirts and the Communist element, and also the nightriders and the vigilantes" (Scranton Commission Report, 1970:254). On this day, there seemed to be a misunderstanding of a statement made by Governor Rhodes referring to an injunction " . . .

equivalent to a state of emergency . . . " (Scranton Commission Report, 1970:255). It seems that the university officials understood this injunction to mean that the National Guard had complete, legal authority on the campus (Best, 1981). At this time, according to the Scranton Commission Report (1970:255), university officials:

> Prepared and distributed 12,000 leaflets which listed curfew hours; said the governor, through the National Guard, had assumed legal control of the campus; stated that all outdoor demonstrations and rallies, peaceful or otherwise, were prohibited by the state of emergency; and said the Guard was empowered to make arrests.

Though Best (1981:51) argues that

> The leaflet was based on the assumption that the state of emergency was in effect (which was not true) and, as a result, "the only accurate information in this document are the curfew hours."

Sunday afternoon, the campus was relatively quiet, but "Sunday night witnessed an escalation in violence between demonstrators and authorities, indicating that both groups were losing patience with the other" (Best, 1981:53). That night, a group of students began to gather around on the Commons at 8 p.m. Best (1981) and the Scranton Commission Report (1970) indicate that by 8:45 p.m., the crowd had grown so large that the curfew was altered from 1 a.m. to 9 p.m., at which time the Ohio Riot Act was read to the crowd and the National Guard gave them five minutes to disperse. The crowd did not readily disperse but broke into two groups. One group headed for President White's home, was tear-gassed by the National Guard, and then headed back to the Commons. Some of the students from this group joined the second group, which went to Prentice Gate at the corner of Main and Lincoln, blocking the traffic in the intersection of Main and Lincoln. As the Scranton Commission Report (1970:257) noted:

> A sizable crowd sat down in the intersection of Lincoln and Main, next to the gates, and asked to speak with Satrom and White about six demands: abolition of the ROTC; removal of the Guard from campus by Monday night; lifting of the curfew; full amnesty for all persons arrested Saturday night; lower student tuition; and granting of any demand by the Black United Students.

This request was denied and, at 11 p.m., the police told the demonstrators that the curfew was in effect and the Ohio Riot Act was read once again (Best, 1981). As Best (1981:53) further reports, "Rocks were thrown, obscenities shouted, while tear gas and a bayonet charge by the National Guard was used to clear people from the intersection and drive them back across campus." The Scranton Commission Report (1970) noted that two students and three guardsmen were hurt in this confrontation.

These three days had considerable importance for what was yet to come on May 4. The hostility between the students and guardsmen had increased. This was due to a number of things. The students' hostility was a result of what they considered to be broken promises; the guardsmens' hostility was a result of the students' curses, stone-throwing, and refusals to obey (Best, 1981).

One final item pertaining to the National Guard is important. Immediately preceding their orders into Kent, Ohio, the National Guardsmen were on duty in Akron, Ohio, " . . . as a result of a truckers strike which had been violent periodically" (Best, 1981:32). Best (1981:33) further notes that "These were the guardsmen ordered to Kent on May 2, after four days of hard, grueling, and potentially dangerous duty in Akron."

In light of the preceding information, I will present a description of the confrontation of May 4 between the students and the guardsmen. Basically, I will give an account of those two hours and then review what and how the information was obtained regarding those elements of collective behavior brought up in Chapter II as essential to increasing our understanding and explanation of collective behavior. The concern of the following sections is an attempt to clarify the state of affairs regarding these elements. Have the elementary features been attended to, and if so, how well? The previous discussion of research regarding these features in Chapters I and II continually espouses that we have paid minimal attention to certain essential information that would provide us with a more complete understanding of crowds. The point of examining the literature pertaining to May 4, with these elementary features kept in mind, is to evaluate where research regarding collective behavior stands. One can ask if the only deficiency involves inaccuracy of reporting and the lack of intersubjectivity, or have we also neglected what have been termed the essential building blocks for pursuing an understanding of collective behavior.

## THE EVENTS OF MAY 4, 1970

To reiterate, on Friday, May 1, a rally was called for Monday, noon, May 4, to discuss the Cambodia incursion and other student demands. Most reports (i.e., Best, 1981; Davies, 1973; Kelner and Munves, 1980; Scranton Commission Report, 1970) agree that the purpose of the rally of May 4 had changed: it was now a protest against the presence of the National Guard on campus. As Best (1981:57) notes, " . . . participation in the noon rally was viewed by some as a symbolic protest of and challenge to the authority of the Guard on campus." Not all students who had gathered on the Commons at 11 a.m. were there to demonstrate. Many of the students on the Commons, which serves as a crossroads on the campus, were going to and from classes or were there out of idle curiosity. The Scranton Commission Report (1970:265) indicates:

> A majority of the crowd was watching the tableau from the patio of Taylor Hall and from the slopes around the adjacent buildings of Prentice, Johnson, and Stopher Halls. The hills made a natural amphitheater from which students could watch events on the Commons floor.

But in the end, it made no difference why the students were assembled. The actions of the National Guard did not distinguish between the demonstrators and the spectators.

According to Best (1981:57), "People began to gather on the Commons as early as 11 a.m." By 11:45, the crowd had grown quite large, although no one estimate of the crowd size was dominant (as we shall see later in this chapter). At this time, a Kent State University policeman, Harold E. Rice, ordered the students to disperse, thereby enforcing a decision made that morning that no rally would be allowed (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). Davies (1973:33) contends that "The students were lawfully assembled and the National Guard was unlawfully ordering them to disperse." The students reacted to this order by shouting obscenities and throwing stones. Best (1981:58) indicates, " . . . there were no university officials involved in the attempt to stop the rally . . . . [President] White apparently assumed that the Guard was now in control of the campus and there was no need for him to be personally involved." At 11:55 a.m., the guardsmen chosen to carry out the dispersal orders were ordered to "lock and load" their weapons (Davies, 1973). At this time, students began to ring the Victory Bell and 8-10 guardsmen fired two volleys of tear gas canisters at the crowd (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). But this did not accomplish the task of dispersing the crowd. As Best (1981:59) indicates, " . . . a stiff crosswind and poor aim by the guardsmen made the barrage largely ineffective." This had the effect of increasing the students' hostility; they proceeded to throw the canisters back at the guardsmen.

Because of this confrontation between the students and the guardsmen, Brigadier General Canterbury ordered the National Guard troops to move out (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). The purpose of this was to disperse the crowd and then bring the troops back to the ROTC building. It should be pointed out that the weather was very warm on this day and the guardsmen were wearing gas masks. These gas masks made seeing and breathing difficult (Best, 1981). Therefore, the already harried guardsmen were made more uncomfortable.

During the guardsmen's advance, some of the students retreated, " . . . some of them going back up and over the hill behind the Victory Bell (Blanket Hill) and around Taylor Hall" (Best, 1981:60). Davies (1973:36) reports:

> . . . a few students lingered at the crest of Blanket Hill to shout obscentities at the men of Troop G, who, since the departure of Company C, now held the extreme left flank of the line with Company A strung out to the right.

When Brigidier General Canterbury reached the crest of Blanket Hill, he concluded that it would be necessary to push the students beyond a football practice field which lay about 80 yards below the crest of Blanket Hill (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). Most Kent State University reports conclude that this was an error in judgement. This movement allowed the students to break into two groups, thereby harassing the guardsmen from the Prentice Hall parking lot and the walk at the bottom of Blanket Hill (Best, 1981). As Best (1981:61) further states:

> . . . the Guard were under a heavy barrage of rocks and verbal abuse, and the tear gas vollies [sic] merely produced a "tennis match," with the demonstrators hurling the tear gas cannisters back at the guardsmen.

The guardsmen stayed on the football field for approximately 10 minutes, then Brigadier General Canterbury " . . . ordered his troops to retrace their steps back up Blanket Hill" (Scranton Commission Report, 1970:268). The Scranton Commission Report (1970:268) further notes:

> The Guard's march from Blanket Hill to the football field and back did not disperse the crowd and seems to have done little else than increase tension, subject guardsmen to needless abuse, and encourage the most violent and irresponsible elements in the crowd to harass the Guard further.

The students, seeing the guardsmen retreating, continued to taunt them. Best (1981:62) indicates:

> The crowd did not act en masse; some stayed at the foot of Blanket Hill . . . and others ran around the end of Taylor Hall toward the Commons. Individuals and small groups followed the guardsmen as they trudged up the hill, their backs to the people below.

These individuals and small groups were the most active and hostile participants. The Scranton Commission Report (1970:271) contends that this core group consisted of between 20 and 50 people and pursued the guardsmen " . . . at a range varying from 10 to 80 yards."

According to Davies (1973:37), there were three times when the guardsmen aimed their rifles at the students: (1) At 12:05, when three guardsmen aimed their rifles at an undisclosed target; (2) at approximately 12:15, when members of Troop G aimed their rifles at students in the Prentice Hall parking lot; and (3) at 12:24, when the guardsmen actually fired.

There is still a great amount of controversy over the issue of why the guardsmen fired and who actually fired. The Scranton Commission Report (1970:273) indicates that in the end:

> Twenty-eight guardsmen have acknowldeged firing from Blanket Hill. Of these, 25 fired 55 shots from rifles, two fired five shots from a .45 caliber pistols, and one fired a single blast from a shotgun. Sound tracks indicate that the firing of these 61 shots lasted approximately 13 seconds.

The outcome of this confrontation was four persons killed and nine wounded. Another outcome was individuals, groups, a university, a town, a state, and a nation in turmoil, wondering how and why it happened and getting few answers. The closest student wounded was 20 yards from the Guard: the farthest, 245-250 yards (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). The closest student killed was 85-90 yards from the Guard; the farthest, 130 yards (Scranton Commission Report, 1970).

There was only one other incident of students gathering that day. As the Scranton Commission Report (1970:278) indicates, "After the casualties were removed, [approximately] 200-300 students began to gather on the hills overlooking the Commons." Faculty Marshalls appealed to the students to leave. Some did, others had to be carried off. Approximately one hour after the shooting, the area was clear of students and guardsmen. Of the reports that I have reviewed, there was considerable agreement that the use of loaded firearms by the guardsmen was inappropriate. The Scranton Commission Report (1970:289), I feel, sums it up best:

> The actions of some students were violent and criminal, and those of some others were dangerous, reckless, and irresponsible. The indiscriminate firing of rifles into a crowd of students and the deaths that followed were unnecessary, unwarranted, and inexcusable.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DESCRIPTION

The episode of collective behavior of May 4 has been described above in generalities for two reasons: (1) to confine the specific discussion of the elements of collective behavior brought up in Chapter II and discussed in the following sections; and (2) because the reports that I have reviewed (i.e., Davis, 1973; Eszterhas and Roberts, 1970; Scranton Commission Report, 1970) have, in fact, described the crowd and its movements in terms of generalities rather than specifics. For example, the Scranton Commission Report (1970:263) indicates, "The students responded with curses and stones;" and Eszterhas and Roberts (1970:151) note, "The crowd was growing and milling." These generalities are the type of statements that many social scientists (i.e., Fisher, 1972; Milgram and Toch, 1965; McPhail, 1972; et al.) argue we should avoid because they do not answer the following types of questions: Which students threw stones--all of them or only an active core, of how many, and how was the crowd growing, obviously in numbers, but how many?

The examination of the confrontation between the guardsmen and the students was greatly aided by photographs. The Scranton Commission Report (1970) used over 50 photographs in its analysis. But even with these photographs, I found that the elements of collective behavior, such as the number and locomotion of the participants, were inaccurately reported or coated in generalities. I will now turn attention to those elements of collective behavior brought up in Chapter II.

Leadership. We know that a group of History graduate students--World Historians Opposed to Racism and Exploitation (WHORE)-- called a rally for Monday noon, but we do not know if they were a part of the active core on that day. This raises the question of whether there was a leader(s) in the student group. Lewis (1978:75) notes, "Whether there were leaders present on May 4 is a source of considerable dispute." A key point regarding this is how do we know leadership when it is present? One certain aspect is that the Kent State 4, four students previously arrested and suspended from school following an incident with the campus police in 1969, were not behind the event, and the Scranton Commission Report (1970) indicates that specific radical leaders did not influence the events. Davies (1973:221) cites one of the principal conclusions drawn by the FBI investigation: "Apparently, the crowd was without a definite leader, although at least three persons carried flags." Out of the books and articles that I have reviewed, only one other article dealt with leadership within the student group. Analyzing the event using Smelser's (1962) theory of collective behavior, Lewis (1978:75) indicates, "My own observation indicated no formal leadership from either groups or individuals." But by using Smelser's (1962) idea that "events" can serve as models of leadership, Lewis (1978:75) further offers, " . . . the chanting of the active core . . . served to channel the verbal action of the entire body of the students toward the National Guard."

In terms of the National Guard, Davies (1973:34) indicates that "The advance of the National Guard was directed by three senior officers: Brigadier General Canterbury, Lieutenant Colonel Fassinger, and Major Jones." But as the Scranton Commission Report (1970:273) notes, "Canterbury, Fassinger, and Jones--the three ranking officers on the hill--all said no order to fire was given." So much for the National Guard's leadership.

Physical Conditions Created By Dense Aggregates of People. The degree of density of the crowd is an important determinant of the subjective interpretation of the immediate environment. It also plays an important role in gauging how much freedom of physical movement is possible by the participants and can vary from those at the core to those members at the fringe. This feature was neglected in the literature that was reviewed, in that no information on this element of collective behavior was found.

Crowd Shape. For the most part, I found no research indicating the crowd shape. In utilizing Smelser's (1962) theory of collective behavior, particularly the organization of a hostile outburst, which partly depends on a preexisting crowd structure, Lewis (1978:75) found that "The presence of students moving back and forth across the Commons . . . created a fairly organized precrowd structure in a clearly defined ecological space." This still does not inform us on the shape of the crowd but does lend us an idea.

In discussing the National Guard's movement onto the football field, Davies (1973:38) noted, "Thus he [Canterbury] exposed the guardsmen to virtual encirclement by students . . . ." Thus, the focal point was the National Guard and the crowd of students formed a circular pattern around them. A circular arrangement permits, according to Milgram and Toch (1965:518), " . . . the most efficient arrangement of individuals around a point of focus." As stated previously, this statement cannot simply be assumed to hold true in all cases and should be the basis for further research. This type of statement, for instance, does not indicate for whom this arrangement is most efficient, whether the speaker or event, the crowd, or both. In the above incident, however, the crowd did form a circular arrangement, which may indicate that circularity is tempered by a directional versus a nondirectional event.

Lewis (1978:73) also indicates another time when the guardsmen were the focal point, but does not mention the shape of the crowd. Lewis (1978:73) notes that " . . . the focal point of the Guard around the ROTC building made it quite easy for the active core to direct its action toward the Guard."

Crowd Boundaries. Three groups of students were identified by Lewis (1978): the active core on the Commons, the cheerleaders, and the spectators. Lewis (1978:71) further notes:

> The core stood around the Victory Bell yelling at the Guard who were protecting the burned down ROTC building. The cheerleaders and the spectators were concentrated primarily on Taylor Hill and the nearby dorms which are both on the edge of the Commons.

More specifically, the cheerleaders were near the active core on Taylor Hall hill, and the spectators grouped further up the hill on the surrounding buildings (Lewis, 1978).

The Scranton Commission Report (1970) noted that once the National Guard started to retrace their steps up Blanket Hill, approximately 100 spectators on the east terrace of Taylor Hall watched the National Guard; another 100 on a slope below the east side of Taylor Hall threw rocks; and about 10-50 persons, following the guardsmen at ranges of 20-80 yards, were the most active in the throwing of rocks.

Even though the crowd had fanned out in different directions at times, Lewis (1978:76) concludes, "The guard kept themselves as the focal point and students kept dividing into the active core, the cheerleaders and the spectators." But Lewis (1978) does not indicate how he arrived at that assessment.

A boundary defines the limit or extent of the crowd and is characterized by permeability and sharpness (Milgram and Toch, 1965). Davies (1973) makes a good point when describing the permeability of the crowd of students. Major Jones noticed a command confusion on the football field, and Davies (1973), citing the Justice Department, revealed that "The Major walked through the crowd to find out if General Canterbury wanted assistance." Davies (1973) also cites Michner (1971), who noted that Major Jones rejoined the main force by elbowing his way through the crowd of students. Therefore, Davies (1973:38) concludes:

> If the demonstrators were as dangerous as Canterbury claimed after the killings, could a solitary officer have elbowed his way through them without some kind of incident?

Therefore, at this time, the density of the crowd was not very high, but the permeability was.

Related to the permeability is the sharpness of a boundary. The sharpness of a boundary can provide a description of the distinction between two groups, for example, participants and agents of social control. The sharpness may also indicate where a boundary confrontation is likely to take place. In the review of the literature, I found no research indicating the sharpness of the crowd. In sum, there was no information delineating definite breaks between participants, and the participants and the agents of social control.

Individuals or Groups in Collective Behavior. For the most part, the studies did not distinguish whether individuals or groups made up the crowd. Of the books and articles that I have researched, the Scranton Commission Report (1970:267) had only one statement dealing with students going as individuals or groups to the rally: "Among those who departed was a student who had gone to the rally with a classmate, William Schroeder." Kelner and Munves (1980) addressed the issue but limited it to the testimony involving those students wounded or killed. Eszterhas and Roberts (1970) reported on only a few students.

Of these reports, it seemed pretty well split as to who went as individuals and who went with one or more persons. There is some indication that the students were familiar with one another. As Eszterhas and Roberts (1970:146) note, "On campus the word was out. 'See you on the Commons at noon' students called to each other as they trekked to class."

But this still leaves a considerable number of students that we do not know about. Most reports (i.e., Best, 1981; Davies, 1973; Scranton Commission Report, 1970; et al.) described the gathering of students in generalities. The Scranton Commission Report (1970:261) was typical in describing the assemblage:

> About 11 a.m., students began gathering on the Commons, apparently for a variety of reasons. Some had heard vaguely that a rally would be held. Some came to protest the presence of the Guard. Some were simply curious, or had free time becuase their classes had been cancelled. Some students stopped by on their way to or from lunch or class.

Both numbers and groups, if any, were omitted from the analysis.

Crowd Size. There is no major consensus in the literature estimating the crowd size on May 4 at Kent State University. In fact, the size of the crowd was often never mentioned. It seems to be taken for granted that the students were acting as a single entity.

At the start of the rally, Best (1981:57) indicates:

> People began to gather on the Commons as early as 11 a.m. Some were aware of the proposed noon rally and wanted to take part. Many went out of curiosity, because as many said, "They wanted to see what was going on."

What number constitutes "many" or "some" is left undefined. As the event progressed, the reports were more specific at various times, but a wide range still existed in terms of numbers. Best (1981:57) notes that "By 11:45 a.m., ninety-nine guardsmen faced a crowd across the Commons estimated at 1,200 to 4,500." That is a considerahle gap. Davies (1973) reports a crowd size of 2,000 to 3,000. The Scranton Commission Report (1970:263) notes two estimates: (1)"Fassinger estimated that by 11:45 a.m., the crowd had grown to more than 500;" and (2)"shortly before noon, there was a crowd of 2,000 or so on or near the Commons." Eszterhas and Roberts (1970) concluded that the total number of students was 4,500. Best (1981:57), citing a survey by Taylor (1971), found that 70 percent of the students that Taylor (1971) interviewed thought there were less than 2,000 people on the Commons at the time.

In terms of the active core, Best (1981:57) states, "There is agreement an active core of people around the Victory Bell, numbering 200 to 1,500, shouted slogans at the Guard." One can see that this varies by 1,300 students--in my opinion, quite a few people. Eszterhas and Roberts (1970) estimate an active core of 1,500, while the FBI Report (Scranton Commission Report, 1970) estimates 200.

On the hills surrounding the Commons, Brigadier General Canterbury estimated 1,000 or more persons, with approximately 800 students on the Commons (Scranton Commission Report, 1970). Best (1981:57) notes that

" . . . on the surrounding hill were 1,000 to 3,000 'cheerleaders' and 'spectators'." Again, a large discrepancy. Eszterhas and Roberts (1970) indicate 3,000 on the hills.

Participant Characteristics. The characteristics of participants can usually be obtained fairly accurately after the event. In my review of the literature on Kent State University on May 4, this element of collective behavior was researched, but in general, I found the focus to be on the political persuasion of the participants.

The Scranton Commission Report (1970) noted that the FBI Report (1970) came to the conclusion that neither the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) nor the Kent State 4 were involved in planning or directing the events of May 1-4. Therefore, the rally was mainly a student protest. The Scranton Commission Report (1970:261) notes, "Many of the students who described themselves as 'straight' or conservative, later attributed their presence at the rally to a desire to protest against the National Guard." Eszterhas and Roberts (1970:151) cited a few students' opinions on who was there:

> When he looked over the crowd, Michael Erwin felt the same way: "The crowd was made up of the Greeks, athletes, and the largest segment of the group were, like me, antiwar moderates." Student Buzz Terhune described the crowd this way: "You had superstraight Joe Fraternity and ultra-radical Joe Freak out there."

In terms of political persuasion, Taylor, et al., (1971) distinguished between those students who attended the rally and those who did not. This was the only study that explored this difference. Taylor et al., (1971:68) note that "While only two percent of the observers and one percent of the nonattenders considered themselves radical, 28 percent of the participants indicated that they were radical." This suggests that self-selection was an important factor in determining who participated on May 4, because self-identified "radicals" made up four percent of all students, while they constituted 28 percent of the rally participants (Taylor, et al., 1971).

A study by Ademek and Lewis (1973:346) supports this when they state, "Our own data on the thirty participants . . . indicate they were more radical prior to the event." Ademek and Lewis (1973) also matched the 30 participants who definitely engaged in violent confrontation with authorities on May 4 with 30 other students who had not. These students were matched on six variables (viz., sex, college major, parents' political views, Hollingshead's (1957) two-factor social class index, religion, and college grade-point-average), and " . . . chi-square tests indicated no significant differences between the two groups on the matched variables with the exception of grade-point-average" (Ademek and Lewis, 1973:344). In terms of grade-point-average, twenty percent of the participants had GPAs of 3.0 or above while forty-three percent of the matched controls had GPAs of 3.0 or above. This finding was significant at less than the .01 level.

Further analysis indicated that the participants were more likely to have engaged in previous protest activities ($p < .01$). Also, they tended to see themselves more as either radicals, radical-liberals, or liberals than did the controls ($p < .01$). Finally, Ademek and Lewis (1973:344) indicate:

> In addition . . . the 30 May 4 participants proved not to differ significantly from their controls on the following: race, age, size of hometown, home state, academic class, father's and mother's educational levels, father's and mother's disciplinary style, and father's occupation.

As a result of their research, Ademek and Lewis (1973:347) find support for a radicalization hypothesis where social control violence appears to radicalize those who are confronted by it, specifically, they argue that

" . . . the extreme social control force applied by the National Guard radicalized the students most directly involved." The research cited above tends to support McPhail (1972) who found that socio-economic and demographic attributes have a low correlation with behavior.

Crowd Movement. With the use of direct and indirect observation, the movement of the crowd was recorded. According to the Scranton Commision Report (1970:270), "The crowd's movements can be reconstructed from testimony, photographs, and investigations." This was in reference to the crowd's movement a few minutes before the shootings. All other specific reports of the crowd's movement also dealt with the time before the shooting.

Kelner and Munves (1980:15) note:

> In tragic accidents there are . . . the critical factors of time, space, and distance. Where a person was at a particular instant, the exact sequence of events (did A happen before B or B before A?), and the directions in which participants or witnesses were moving are the essential material out of which cases are built.

Investigation of the process of events, as suggested above, is what researchers (cf. McPhail, 1972, McPhail and Wohlstein, 1982; Wohlstein, 1977) indicate we should give more systematic attention to, and suggestions have been offered to deal with this area. Kelner and Munves (1980:173) attempted to establish the above critical factors by using a film shot " . . . with an 8mm home movie camera from a distance of almost half a mile through a zoom lens that distorted distances." Kelner and Munves (1980) note that to compensate for these problems, the Justice Department, using a photo-interpreting firm:

> . . . enhanced the image by digital processing, along with careful frame-by-frame measurements and calculations, which revealed the precise movement of students relative to the guardsmen just before the shooting.

Kelner and Munves (1980:174) further note, "Here for the first time was complete information on the numbers of students on the hill, their distance from the Guard, and the direction in which they had been moving." The students' speed was estimated at 3 to 10 miles per hour but was not accurately determinable (Kelner and Munves, 1980). The minutes before the shooting was the only time I found an attempt to systematically record the crowd's movement.

In terms of the formation of the crowd, reports distinguished why the students came to the rally; noted that the Commons was a crossroads for the students between classes; and indicated, once assembled, where the students were. But these reports failed to give attention to the question of whether the students came individually or with others, and were not consistent in estimating crowd size.

Between the time of the formation of the crowd and a few minutes before the shooting, the movements of the crowd were reported, especially in terms of the active core, but were not systematically researched. The crowd's movement was reported in generalities; e.g. "The guardsmen marched across the flat Commons, the students scattering before them up a steep hill beyond the Victory Bell" (Scranton Commission Report, 1970:266).

SUMMARY

In sum, it seems that researchers are neglecting the elementary features of collective behavior. It was proposed that an examination of Kent State University in May, 1970, in light of the elementary features cited, would yield information on the stage of knowledge concerning episodic events of collective behavior. By drawing attention to these features, it was found that research on Kent State University did not deal adequately with them. In fact, a description of the events was very general and inconsistent across the literature. It follows accordingly that two points can be made as to why this is so: (1) the short span of time within which this event occurred did not allow researchers to adequately deal with this event; and (2) researchers were not adequately prepared to study this event in terms of theoretical knowledge of collective behavior and empirical knowledge of processes which involve the elementary features of collective behavior. These two points need not be seen as distinct but can be viewed as complimentary. It is suggested that the latter point is the more problematic, due to researchers (e.g., Berk, 1972; Fisher, 1972; McPhail and Wohlstein, 1982; Pickens, 1975) having advanced strategies to deal with the first point.

By an examination of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement which spanned approximately three months, further evidence will be gathered as to how well the elementary features of collective behavior are attended to. The length of time involved in this event is considerably longer; therefore, this event should be covered more systematically since social movements, as a form of collective behavior, are noted to be more organized.

# CHAPTER IV

# AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ELEMENTARY FEATURES OF COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR: THE BERKELEY FREE SPEECH MOVEMENT

## INTRODUCTION

In contrast to the brief episodes of collective behavior involved at Kent State on the days of May 1-4, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement spanned months in 1964. This duration may indicate either more organization on the part of students to achieve their stated goals and/or these goals were more readily attainable than those found at the Kent State protest. In light of this, this chapter will isolate and examine one incident within this time period and thereby attempt to arrive at further conclusions regarding our present knowledge of the methodological and theoretical issues involved in collective behavior.

It would seem logical to suggest that our knowledge of the events at Berkeley during the last months of 1964 would be more comprehensive than that obtained at Kent State University. The basis for this argument is that since this movement lasted considerable longer, social scientists would have had more time to prepare and to focus their research efforts, thereby obtaining more accurate information concerning their area of interest. This will be the major focus of this chapter, as was true with Chapter III. The specific questions that will be addressed are as follows: (1) What were social scientists concerned with when reviewing a particular episode of collective behavior in terms of the Berkeley Free Speech Movement; and (2) how well did they accomplish their stated objectives.

Similar to Chapter III, a brief summary of the background of the events at Berkeley in the last months of 1964 will be provided, and secondly, there will be a review of the major literature that examined the particular chosen event, and finally, attention will be focused on those elements of collective behavior that researchers (e.g., McPhail, 1972; Milgram and Toch, 1965; Fishcr, 1972; Pickens, 1975) argue should be the main concern when researching episodes of collective behavior.

To reiterate the approach taken in Chapter III and that will subsequently be followed in this chapter, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement (henceforth referred to as the Berkeley FSM) will be examined within the context of three areas: (1) the origins or background of the major incidents; (2) within the event itself; and (3) the outcomes of the event in light of their goal and what previously happened. By evaluating this event, further information can be generated on the degree to which the elementary features of collective behavior are attended to by social scientists. Consequently, if these features have not been attended to, could this information have been obtained? If they have been, is the information such as the type that has been shown in previous chapters to be warranted; in other words, is the information as detailed and descriptive as would be necessary for one to conclude that the elementary features of collective behavior have been attended?

Finally, by comparing and contrasting this information with the information obtained in regards to Kent State University, final conclusions will be drawn as to where research efforts stand in regard to these aspects of collective behavior.

For the purpose of this paper, a brief consideration of the events which occurred from September through December, 1964, is necessary to properly summarize the Berkeley FSM. The events which occurred in September will comprise the origins of the movement, although it can be argued that prior events (e.g., the civil rights movement in the preceding summer) were also involved. The capture of the police car on October 1-2 will be the main focus of analysis, and finally, those events preceding the police car incident will be summarized so as to acquaint the reader with the actions of collective behavior and the outcomes which followed. The rationale for choosing the police car incident involves the considerable length of time (32 hours) during which the action took place, and also, it seems most conducive to examining the elementary features of collective behavior (viz., boundary maintenance of the crowd, the action of common focusing, leadership, crowd shape and crowd size).

The summary of the events which took place in the last months of 1964 will be limited to reviewing the overt collective action by the students. The task of this thesis is to examine the literature on specifically chosen events of collective behavior in light of the previously proposed elementary features of collective behavior. It is not to debate the ideological or moral issues involved, nor to report on the various verbal and written interactions occurring within and between the administration, faculty and students. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine crowd phenomena, to study the crowd, per se, and the methods of studying crowd phenomena; in other words, the "what" not the "why." Therefore, these latter issues will only be brought into the summary where it is deemed necessary. It must be noted that this is not to argue that these aspects are not important or necessary, it is simply they are not relevant to the purpose at hand, i.e. an analysis of crowd phenomena. The ideological issues and behind-the-scenes behavior which took place have been covered by many books and articles (cf. Bell and Kristol, 1969; Draper, 1965; Foster and Long, 1970; Glazer, 1970; Heirich, 1971; Hook, 1970; Katz and Associates, 1968; Lipset and Wolin, 1965; Miller and Gilmore, 1965; Skolnick, 1969). The reader is advised to refer to these sources for further information.

Finally, as is true with most social movements, one cannot pinpoint a specific beginning or even a specific end. In fact, most social movements have a variety of beginnings and many ramifications, even after most people agree the highlights are over. It is with this kept in mind that the fall semester in 1964 is chosen as the starting point of the summary.

BACKGROUND TO OCTOBER 1, 1964

The Berkeley FSM[1] in 1964 is an event involving collective behavior to which social scientists have continually turned their attention. In fact, the term "student protest" is often a referant for the Berkeley FSM. As one study (Scranton Commission Report, 1970:22) indicates, the events of Berkeley in late 1964 " . . . became the prototype for student protest throughout the decade."

The Berkeley FSM was also one of the first attempts to systematically research a student protest. As Fisher (1972:188) acknowledges, "Beginning

---

[1] The following summaries represent a compilation of the works of Bell and Kristol, 1968; Draper, 1965; The Editors of the California Monthly, 1965; Foster and Long, 1970; Glazer, 1970; Heirich, 1971; Hook, 1970; Katz and Associates, 1968; Lipset and Wolin, 1965; Krassner, 1965; Marine, 1965; Miller and Gilmore, 1965; Raskin, 1965; Sale, 1973; Scranton Commission Report, 1970; Searle, 1965; Skolnick, 1969; Spence, 1965; Warshaw, 1965. Any specific references will be duly cited.

with the Free Speech Movement . . . colleges have become veritable laboratories of collective behavior."

The University of California has one of the largest student populations in the U.S. and is under the statewide administration of the Regents of California, along with eight other campuses. In 1964, the Berkeley campus contained approximately 27,000 students; when broken down, this accounts for approximately 18,000 undergraduates and 10,000 graduate students (Glazer, 1970). The freshman and sophomore classes only account for approximately 28 percent of the total student body (Heirich, 1971). In addition, there are about 12,000 faculty and nonacademic employees (Wolin and Schaar, 1965).

The University of California at Berkeley is not separated from the town of Berkeley, as is true with other campuses. In this case, the campus is surrounded by the town and separated only be various streets and sidewalks. The traditional areas for distributing literature and setting up tables by students were the Hyde Park area of the Student Union Plaza, and the strip of land around Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue. In the past, the Hyde Park area had been objected to by the students, due to the location which " . . . is not in the regular pathway of students" (Heirich, 1971:105). Therefore, most of the activity took place at an " . . . entrance to the campus at the corner of Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue on a strip of land some twenty-seven feet wide" (Searle, 1965:94). Furthermore, it should be noted that land which belonged to the University could be used as a place to distribute literature and give speeches but not to organize, collect money, or distribute advocative literature. The strip of land at Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue had been used previously for political action and the collection of money by various groups, and this had been ignored by the administration. This may be due to a variety of reasons, either because the University had thought it belonged to the City of Berkeley or because they chose not to make an issue out of it.

As Sale (1973:162) indicates,

> The First Battle of Berkeley began on September 14, 1964, with an announcement from the administration of the University of California at Berkeley that organizing and soliciting funds for off campus political action would henceforth be banned from the campus at the usual areas.

Specifically, this meant the Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue area, and was to be effective beginning September 21, 1964. Somehow, it had come to the attention of the administration that this land, formerly thought to be owned by the City of Berkeley, was, in fact, the property of the Regents of the University of California and therefore, subject to the restrictions that the University sets forth, i.e. no advocacy, organization or collection of money. An ironic piece of information is that in September of 1959, President Kerr, noting the strip as a potential source of trouble,

> . . . got the regents to agree that it ought to be turned over to the city for the use as a public plaza. But, for reasons still unexplained, the University's treasurer never carried out the instructions to deed over the strip (Raskin, 1965: 86).

The students were not pleased with the decision of the administration, and at this point, 18-20 student organizations, both liberal and conservative organizations affected by the decision, formally petitioned for the use of the area. This group of organizations came to be known as the United Front. Instead, the administration offered the following decision to accommodate the students: the Hyde Park area was still offered, as was an area on Sproul Hall steps, on an experimental basis, and in regard to the

Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue strip, the students could pass out literature and make speeches, but not advocative literature and speeches; in other words, the guidelines set forth by University policy was to be maintained. This was unacceptable to the students, and led to the first all-night vigil. The vigil began at 9 p.m. on Sproul Hall steps and lasted until 9 a.m., the next morning. The estimates of crowd size range from approximately 300, when the vigil began, to about 75-100 persons in the morning (Draper, 1965; Heirich, 1971; Editors of the California Monthly, 1965).

The next incident of collective action taken by the students occurred on September 28, 1964. The United Front conducted a rally at an unauthorized location, in various reports termed "the Rally Tree" (Heirich, 1971:116), "Dwinelle Plaza" (Draper, 1965:33), "in front of Wheeler Hall" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965:106), and then formed a picket line which marched to a scheduled chancellor's meeting at the Student Union Plaza. Various reports (e.g., Heirich, 1971; Draper, 1965) indicated that the students " . . . circled in a serpentine pattern through the aisles . . . " (Heirich, 1971:116) as well as around the perimeter (Draper, 1965:33). Estimates of crowd size indicate 1000-1500 students.

Tables had been set up at this time in various areas (Sather Gate, and Bancroft Way and Telegraph Avenue), many illegally, because they were distributing advocative literature. On September 29, 1964, the tables were once again set up. The only action taken against students was verbal in that the police simply informed them that their activities were illegal and, in a few cases, asked for identification. But the setting up and manning of tables and the response of the administration on September 30,1964, was the impetus to the first mass sit-in involving Sproul Hall, and also the sit-in involving the police car. The latter will be the main focus of analysis.

Tables had been set up at noon,Wednesday,and "Within ten minutes members of the dean's office staff and the campus police were at Sather Gate" (Heirich, 1971:122). At this time, five students were cited for manning the illegal tables and were told to meet in Dean Williams office at 3 p.m. that day. The students reacted by drawing up papers with signatures of others who also claimed they had been a part of the manning of tables. At 3 p.m., the five students and others went into Sproul Hall to receive collective disciplinary action. Estimates of the size of this crowd of students were consistently around 500 (Draper, 1965; Heirich, 1971; Editors of the California Monthly, 1965), although the official account of the Chancellor indicates 300-400 persons (Glazer, 1970). At this point, three more students, some reports indicate they were the leaders of the protest (Miller and Gilmore, 1965; Editors of the California Monthly, 1965), were cited, making a total of eight students subject to disciplinary action. The meeting was cancelled because of the large number of persons present at this time. But the students " . . . voted to remain in Sproul Hall until the administration would agree to deal with them" (Heirich, 1971:127). The estimates of those who remained in Sproul Hall were left ambiguously at "hundreds" (Miller and Gilmore, 1965:XXV) and "The students, swelling eventually to several hundreds" (Draper, 1965:35). The sit-in broke up at about 2 a.m. It was during this "sit-in/sleep-in" that the name "Free Speech Movement" was first used and supported by various political organizations (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965). Although, Glazer (1970) maintains that it was on October 2 that the FSM was officially organized. The final decision concerning the eight cited students, which came from the administration, set the tone for what was to follow not only in the next two days but in the following months. The decision rendered was that the students were to be indefinitely suspended.

I would now like to turn to a more detailed examination of the events of collective behavior that occurred October 1-2, 1964. Then, I will give a brief overview of the events of collective action that took place during the following months. The conclusion of this chapter will be an assessment of the description of events during October 1-2 in light of the proposed elementary features of collective behavior and a summary of the findings.

## EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1-2, 1964

On October 1, after the declared suspension of the eight students, a rally was scheduled to begin at noon. Also, tables were set up at two specific locations on campus; at 9 a.m., two tables were set up at Sather Gate while " . . . three tables had been set up on the lower landing of the wide steps leading to the entrance of Sproul Hall" (Heirich, 1971:141). It was at one of these latter tables (specifically Campus CORE) that Jack Weinberg was present. These tables were illegal according to University regulations, especially since they were specifically asking for contributions.

Therefore, at approximately 11:30 a.m., members of the dean's staff went over to the Campus CORE table, " . . . the one nearest the South Entrance to Sproul Hall, from which they emerged" (Heirich, 1971:143). Dean Murphy then requested one person (Weinberg) to desist from manning the table and to leave. Murphy also informed him that if he was a student, he was violating University regulations and if he was a nonstudent, he was violating the trespassing law. Finally, he asked Weinberg to identify himself. Weinberg promptly refused to answer any of the above, and therefore, Dean Murphy requested University of California police Lieutenant Chandler to arrest him. Since Weinberg did not identify himself, he was assumed to be a nonstudent (which he was), meaning that they could place him under arrest for trespassing. The action of placing Weinberg under arrest was the impetus for what was to occur in the next 32 hours, although there were other mutually reinforcing actions which led to the solidarity of the crowd of demonstrators. As Michael Rossman states, when referring to the "'Police Car Episode'": "Understand it and you understand the FSM; the FSM was forged around that car . . . and those two days were a miniature of the entire conflict" (Foster, 1970:47).

"A police car had been driven right into the middle of the plaza, and the police now informed him that he was under arrest for trespassing" (Draper, 1965:41). In addition to Lieutenant Chandler, there were four officers from the University of California police force which brought Weinberg to the police car and prepared to take him away. The students began to surround the police car and literally staged a sit-in. As the Editors of the California Monthly (1965:111) report:

> About 100 students promptly lay down in front of the police car, another 80 or so sat behind it. By noon, about 300 demonstrators surrounded the immobile police car; by 12:30 p.m., several thousand students were crowded around the car--which became the focal point and rostrum for the next 32 hours of student demonstrations.

This was one of the better descriptions of what happened. Many of the reports couched the protestors' actions in generalities; for example,

> At this point a group of students spontaneously threw themselves in front of the car and blocked its path. Soon they were joined by hundreds of others and within an hour the police car was surrounded by a solid phalanx of one thousand bodies (Stern, 1965:23).

Crowd estimates are basically in a range of 2000-3000 (Miller and Gilmore, 1965; Krassner, 1965).

I think Heirich (1971:156) makes a very important point when he states, "When Mario Savio climbed on top of the car in Sproul Hall Plaza, the capture became a focused rally." In terms of the opening moves of the crowd, i.e., the beginning of the sit-in, Heirich (1971:152) further notes " . . . once the proposal was made by word and demonstration it was immediately imitated, just by about twenty-five persons, then by several hundred within a few minutes."

Throughout the sit-in, there was a continuous change of speakers, both for and against the actions of the demonstrators, on top of the police car. Charles Powell, ASUC President, requested that he and Savio attempt to discuss the situation with the administration, specifically the deans, Chancellor Strong, and Vice-Chancellor Sheriffs. They were gone for about an hour while the students continued to hold the police car. Draper (1965:42) indicates at this time, "There were perhaps a couple of hundred actually sitting down . . . but the crowd seemed to extend . . . in every direction around the car, a few thousand in number." Furthermore, "On one side, the broad steps of Sproul Hall acted as a convienent grandstand for a thousand or so, and Savio and Powell had instinctively faced in this direction" (Draper, 1965:43). Heirich (1971:461) makes an important distinction between those who sat and those who stood when he indicated that

> A code quickly developed around the police car to signal whether one was taking part in the capture or was merely watching: persons who stood up were considered to be watching; those who sat down signaled by this posture that they had joined in the capture of the car.

At approximately 2:30 p.m., there was a new direction or action taken by some of the demonstrators on the initiative of Mario Savio, who suggested that some of the students join him in going into Sproul Hall to personally take their request to the dean. Reports indicate that anywhere from 150-200 persons went into Sproul Hall. At approximately 4 p.m., with consistent reports of about 400 persons in Sproul Hall, there was an affirmative vote by the protestors to remain outside the dean's office, thereby preventing anyone from going in or out of the office. Heirich (1971:163) indicates that "This pack-in created a far more explosive situation, because of a series of reactions it triggered."

The protestors had, during this time, agreed to intervention by some faculty members to speak to the administration concerning the situation at hand. It was agreed that if the faculty members set up a meeting with the administration, then those in Sproul Hall would leave.

By approximately 6 p.m., there was no communication between either side, and the police, both campus and Berkeley City police, began closing the front doors of Sproul Hall. As the Editors of the California Monthly (1965:112) report the incident:

> Angered, about 100 of the approximately 2000 students outside Sproul Hall charged the doors, packing them to prevent their closing. About 20 police officers took up stations at the foot of the main stairway leading from Sproul Hall lobby to the second floor, where the deans' offices are. The students took up positions on the lobby floor.

The students finally left at about 9 p.m., when they talked to faculty members who had set up a meeting but were unsuccessful in their requests.

The next major incident of confrontation occurred at approximately 11 p.m., when " . . . small groups of anti-demonstration demonstrators began converging on the mall from all directions, swelling the crowd to about 2500" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965:113). Draper (1965: 44) estimates that there were about 100 Greeks, although he acknowledges that the estimates range from 100-200. Heirich (1971:166), in a more detailed account of the movement of the anti-demonstrators, indicates that

> They quickly encountered a wall of people standing on the edge of the demonstration; the new arrivals spilled around toward Sproul Hall, climbing the steps and forming a half-moon to the east of the police car demonstrators. They did not try to enter the area occupied by the seated demonstrators.

Continuously throughout the night, there appeared to be a boundary confrontation between the seated protestors and the anti-demonstrators, who, at various times, threw things into the seated crowd.

The back and forth verbal abuse between the two groups ended when a priest and later Dean Rice addressed the crowd from the top of the police car. The anti-demonstrators finally left.

The demonstrators remained around the car throughout the next day, October 3. The Editors of the California Monthly (1965:116) report that "At around noon, lunch time onlookers enlarged the crowd to close to 4000 persons."

Discussion between Kerr and Strong indicated that a response to the situation was needed. Police were brought in to disperse the crowd at 6 p.m., if the demonstrators ignored Chancellor Strong's announcement that the assemblage was unlawful and that those present were to disperse. Estimates of the number of police range from 400-500, including motorcycle policemen. But a physical count made by the San Fransisco Examiner indicated 965 policemen (Draper, 1965).

Demonstration spokespersons asked to meet with Kerr at this time. At first, Kerr was not receptive, but finally a meeting was scheduled for 5 p.m.

At approximately 5:30 p.m., " . . . onlookers and protest sympathizers swelled the crowd between Sproul Hall and the Student Union to more than 7000. Spectators lined the Student Union balcony and the roof of the Dining Commons" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965:117). At one point in time, the potential for conflict arose when " . . . six campus police officers penetrated the periphery of the crowd--in an effort to reinforce the stranded police car--the demonstrators packed themselves solidly around the car" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965:117).

At approximately 7:15 p.m., an agreement was reached between Kerr and the demonstration spokesmen which was publicly announced to the crowd around the police car at 7:30 p.m. It ended and the crowd disbanded when Mario Savio, addressing the crowd, stated: "Let us agree by acclamation to accept this document. I ask you to rise quietly and with dignity, and go home" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965:118).

The pact of October 2 was to have considerable implications in the events involving collective behavior which follow. I would now like to turn to a brief overview of the events which followed this pact.

EVENTS PROCEEDING FROM THE POLICE CAR CAPTURE

The next incident of collective behavior took place on October 5. Again, there was a noon rally held on Sproul Hall steps, with various speakers addressing the crowd. This rally resulted in no arrests or major confrontations, although "The rally was technically illegal under University regulations regarding nonstudent speakers" (Editors of the California

Monthly, 1965:121). Many of those who spoke that afternoon, for example Savio, were suspended and therefore technically nonstudents. Of the literature that was reviewed, there were only two estimates of crowd size; the Editors of the California Monthly (1965:121) reported that "approximately 1000 students gathered . . . ." while Draper (1965:64) indicates, "Over 2000 attended . . . . "

In between this event and the next major episode of collective behavior (November 8), attempts to resolve the situation at Berkeley took place mainly in committees composed of students and/or faculty and/or the administration. The suspended students' cases were turned over to the Faculty Committee on Student Conduct, although in a previous agreement, the cases were to be turned over to the Student Conduct Committee of the Academic Senate. This latter committee, though, never existed. There was also considerable debate as to who should sit on the Study Committee on Campus Political Action which was finally expanded with an agreeable compromise on the members, although at a later point, the FSM rejected the committee. Basically, the committee was " . . . in agreement that advocacy of off campus political action should be allowed on campus. They remained divided, however, in regard to actions that might not be 'within the limits of the law'" (Heirich, 1971:229). One final committee that is important and should be noted is the Ad Hoc Academic Senate Committee on Student Suspensions, also known as the Heyman Committee. As its name implies, it reviewed the cases of the eight suspended students.

"On Sunday November 8 . . . the FSM issued a statement announcing its intentions to end the moratorium on direct action civil disobedience" (Heirich, 1971:242). In their opinion, the committees set up to resolve the situation were making little progress, which was not in the direction the FSM wanted. Therefore, at noon the next day, November 9, a rally was held on the steps of Sproul Hall. Also, tables were set up on these steps. Both the FSM and other sympathetic organizations participated. These tables were illegal in that donations were taken and there were sign-up sheets. Reports are consistent in that approximately 75 persons' names were taken by members of the dean's staff. In terms of the rally, various speakers addressed the crowd from the top of an old dresser. The crowd was reported to be about 600, approximately 200 sat down to show support, while about 400 persons just watched from the fringe (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965).

On November 13, the Heyman Committee announced its decision regarding the eight suspended students. Their recommendation included reinstatement of six students effective as of their original suspension dates and " . . . six week suspensions for Art Goldberg and Mario Savio, the suspensions to begin September 30 and end November 16 . . . . " (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965:146).

On November 20, there was a mass student rally on Sproul Hall steps. The purpose was to gather support for a mass vigil and also a march to the regents' meeting. The estimates pertaining to crowd size indicate a range of 3000-5000 students. Heirich (1971:251), in bis analysis of this rally, gave one of the better descriptions of any of the events of collective behavior that occurred at Berkeley in these months. What the description basically amounts to is a brief description of boundary maintenance and boundary interpenetration. It seems that at the same time the FSM called a rally, so did the college pep organizations. The following is an excerpt from Heirich's (1971:251) description:

> Two large, and quite different, crowds collected in the plaza. One, consisting of sympathizers of the FSM, was facing east toward the Sproul Hall steps. The other crowd . . . was facing south, toward the Student Union steps.
>
> Before the FSM could begin its rally, cheerleaders of the other group began leading a 'Beat Stanford' yell. For a while things were tense, for it was clear that neither rally was going to give way to the other.
>
> Then Steve Weisman, a member of the FSM Steering Committee, had an inspiration. He led the FSM crowd in a 'Beat Stanford' yell. The cheerleaders responded with a 'Free Speech' yell. Gradually the two rallies blended, the crowds mingled, and the tension disolved.
>
> With this gesture, the boundaries between the two crowds were broken, people turned east, and the FSM rally began in earnest. Because of the double scheduling of the area and the publicity about the free concert, the group had a very large crowd.

This is an example of how important boundaries can be when examining the behavior of crowds. This example also indicates the composition of the crowd at two different points in time. It does not just state the size of the crowd, without giving other relevant information. Heirich (1971: 252) also gives a very informative description of the march to the regents meeting. Much of the literature just indicated that the crowd marched, whereas Heirich (1971) indicates the direction of the movement, the formation of the crowd during the march and also took account of space and density. As Heirich (1971:252) indicates,

> The FSM steering Committee and the people at the front marched around behind the crowd and then north, toward the main drive of the campus. Monitors moved forward among the crowd, motioning people to join the line six-abreast.
>
> The marching maneuver of circling the crowd effectively broke up the sense of spatial separation that allows persons on the edge of a crowd to remain uninvolved.

Things were relatively quiet over the next few days, but on Novemeber 28, Chancellor Strong sent out letters concerning new disciplinary action against Savio and Goldberg. The letters were in regard to activity on

October 1-2, the period previously assumed to be covered in the Ad Hoc Faculty Committee report which was not heeded but instead, the regents had accepted a proposal which had recommended reinstatement of the students, with suspension as the only penalty for six of the students and that two students, Savio and Goldberg, be on probation for the rest of the current semester. The FSM took these letters as a direct indication of the insincerity of the administration.

In response, the FSM presented an ultimatum to the administration concerning the disciplinary action and the issue of freedom of political activity. The deadline was December 2. Also at this time, before the December 2 sit-in, the Graduate Co-ordinating Committee, sympathetic to the FSM, met and decided to call for a strike of classes beginning on Friday. On December 2, the FSM held a rally in Sproul Hall Plaza, attended by 4000-5000 persons (Heirich, 1971; Marine, 1965), although one report indicated 6000 persons (Draper, 1965). It was at this time that approximately 1000-1500 students began to occupy four floors in Sproul Hall. Heirich (1971:272) indicates that "They came in groups, a steady stream, somewhere between one thousand and fifteen hundred people." Throughout the afternoon and evening, people went in and out of the building, which was officially closed. At 3:05 a.m., December 3, an assemblage of 635 uniformed police officers began making arrests. This was done on the action of Governor Brown, without the approval of President Kerr. On each floor, the students were asked to leave; Draper (1965:104) indicates "About 200 did leave the building before the police reached them, leaving about 800." Also, each student was individually given a chance to leave or face immediate arrest. Each person was given the choice to be walked or be dragged out. The arresting procedure continued through the night and into the next day; it took about twelve hours to arrest the demonstrators. There are different estimates given of the number of persons arrested; these range from 773 persons (Heirich, 1971) to 780 (Fitch, 1965), to 814 (Sale, 1973). Of the literature that was reviewed, there was consistent agreement that the directions to arrest the students was a gross misjudgement, rather, the demonstrators should have been left alone until they disbanded of their own decision.

On December 4, a rally was again held in the Sproul Hall area. Spence (1965:217) indicates at this time, " . . . more than 8000 students rotated picket line duty." In terms of the rally, Heirich (1971:279) notes, "A great crowd had gathered on the Student Union roof and balcony, as well as in the playing field above Sproul Hall across Barrows Lane and on the Plaza itself." The estimates of crowd size vary from 5000 to 10,000 persons. In terms of the elementary features of collective behavior, Heirich (1971:279) notes, "At most rallies each person placed himself so that he had at least a small perimeter of space around him, anywhere from six inches to three feet. That morning . . . . There were no boundaries of personal territory." The rally continued for two hours, with various speakers addressing the crowd. The student strike of classes continued, in fact, it specifically lasted for five days--December 4-8. The effectiveness of the strike remains ambiguous, depending on the source of information.

The final incident of collective behavior that should be mentioned, occurred on December 7 at the Greek Theatre where President Kerr was to give a speech concerning a plan " . . . to inaugurate a new era of freedom under law." At 11 a.m., approximately 16,000 persons were assembled to listen. Mario Savio previously had asked for permission to speak to the audience concerning another FSM rally which was to follow. He was denied permission but stated his intentions to speak anyhow. After President Kerr finished his speech, Savio walked over to the podium and was promptly seized by the police and brought backstage under force. After pleas by various persons, both faculty and students, and a constant chant by members of the audience to let him speak, Savio was allowed to address the crowd.

According to Draper (1965:124), "The students streamed back to Sproul Hall Plaza, which filled up as solidly as had the Greek Theatre, with 8000 to 10,000 people." Two other estimates of crowd size (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965; Heirich, 1971) indicated 10,000 persons. On this day, there was also a vote taken by the Graduate Co-ordinating Committee to end the strike.

Finally, on December 8, the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate met, and by a vote of 824-115, approved "The five-point proposal made by the Committee on Academic Freedom against control of student speech and political advocacy" (Miller and Gilmore, 1965:XXIX). The University Board of Regents did not accept this proposal, and a new committee, the Emergency Executive Committee on Academic Freedom of the Berkeley Division of the Academic Senate, was formed to study the situation. Their decision was accepted and was publicly presented by Martin Meyerson, the man who replaced Strong, who left his position as chancellor on January 2. The announcement is best summed up by Sale (1973), in reference to the Battle of Berkeley. Sale (1973:162) states,

> It ended--as much as such things ever end--three months and twenty days later on January 3, 1965, with an announcement from the same administration that organizing and soliciting funds for off campus political action would henceforth be permitted on campus at the usual areas.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER 1-2, 1964

In this section of the chapter, I would like to assess what information we have gained when examining Berkeley on October 1-2, 1964, in terms of the elementary features of collective behavior. As was true with Chapter III, the episodes of collective behavior occurring on October 1-2 have been described in generalities for two reasons: (1) to confine the specific discussion of the elements of collective behavior to this section; and (2) much of the literature reviewed has, in fact, described the crowd and the actions of the crowd in terms of generalities. One notable exception is that of Heirich (1971). His analysis was the most sociological and, at various times, did provide a comprehensive view of the action of the crowd in terms of the elementary features of collective behavior. But this did not extend consistently throughout the analysis, as Heirich (1971:202) acknowledges in writing of the police car capture," . . . for no direct account of the genesis of this action is available." Therefore, although Heirich (1971) did attend to some of the elementary features of the crowd, they were not analyzed to the degree which many social scientists (i.e. McPhail, 1972; Fisher, 1972; Milgram and Toch, 1965; et al.) argue they should be.

What most authors seemed to do was describe the crowd's movement in generalities, and this only pertains to books and articles that deal directly with the crowd. A majority of the literature confined their major analysis of the crowd to one of two things: (1) a subjective interpretation of the moral and ideological issues involved; or (2) the almost exclusive examination of participant characteristics by the use of survey data. This is the type of information that many argue should not be the limit of analyses of collective behavior, that the main focus of concern must be the crowd, *per se*.

The Berkeley FSM was covered extensively by social scientists, newspapers, and television. This would seem to suggest that records would be available in which to analyze and address the elementary features of collective behavior. Therefore, with this kept in mind, I would now like to turn to an assessment of the description of the events of October 1-2.

*Leadership*. In contrast to Kent State University, leadership was an extensively covered element throughout the literature. But the concern of this section is limited to the events of October 1-2, and when attention is turned to this time period, a systematic analysis of leadership is lacking. The major question that should be addressed is that of recognizing leadership when it is present. There were numerous speakers on the roof of the police car throughout the two days. Are we to assume, therefore, that whoever was on top of the car constituted the leader at the moment? There were only three specific references to the leadership during the police car incident. Heirich (1971:162) indicates that "During the first afternoon two additional personalities emerged as leaders of the demonstration." Heirich (1971) is specifically referring to Dustin Miller and Bettina Aptheker. While Glazer (1970:82) indicates, "By that time, it was clear that the leadership of the movement was now coming exclusively from the civil-rights and left-wing political groups." Mario Savio, by one author (Raskin, 1965:78), referred to as " . . . the archangel of the student revolt," has also been implicated as one of the leaders during this time. As Heirich (1971:157) notes: "At this point individual students began asking Mario Savio questions about who he is, how he became the leader of the demonstration . . . . "

For the most part, the literature (cf. Bell and Kristol, 1969; Draper, 1965; Foster and Long, 1970; Glazer, 1970; Heirich, 1971; et al.) did not distinguish between leaders of the FSM throughout the last part of 1964 and leadership specifically in the events of October 1-2, 1964. By this analysis, one can conclude that either there were no specific leaders involved during the events of October 1-2 or that there was not any attempt by researchers to address the issue.

Physical Conditions Created By Dense Aggregates of People. For the most part, I found little research specifically addressing this element of collective behavior. Heirich (1971:28) discusses the issue when he indicates, "It is clear the individuals in a densely packed, commonly focused crowd often arrive at conclusions they would not have reached by themselves . . . hence arrangements for using time and space . . . affect the ease with which a crisis context can be established and validated among a given set of observers." Furthermore, Heirich (1971:204) in discussing crowds, indicates that "This dense packing of observers should have limited the individual's ability to gather evidence . . . . "

This supports the argument of this thesis that we must pay more systematic attention to the role played by the physical conditions created by dense aggregates of people. But in the literature reviewed, I did not find any application of this element to the crowd. Most of the descriptions were along the lines of describing the crowd in generalities and metaphors. For example, the Editors of the California Monthly

(1965:111) indicate that " . . . by 12:30 p.m., several thousand students were crowded around the car . . . . " or " . . . within an hour the police car was surrounded by a solid phalanx of one thousand bodies" (Stern, 1965:230), and finally, "A police car taking to jail a person charged with manning a table unlawfully was surrounded in a sea of students" (Wolin and Schaar, 1965:354). This use of metaphors, such as those cited above, rather than taking account of the event in a systematic way, is what Milgram and Toch (1965) argue should be avoided. The literature abounds with such metaphors and generalities, and these do nothing to aid us in understanding a crucial feature of the crowd.

Draper (1965:54) accounts for why the police were not requested to arrest the students in the Plaza in terms of the density of the crowd and the role it played. For example, Draper (1965:54) indicates,

> This corridor would have had to be cut through an intervening crowd of a couple of thousand students, who were not themselves sitting down but who were jammed in between the building doors and the sitters, and who would be compressed even more by the movement of other thousands in the Plaza toward the scene of action.

Crowd Shape. This element of collective behavior was also neglected in the literature dealing with the events of October 1-2. The crowd shape has important implications in terms of feedback between participants. It also has implications for agents of social control in that they must gauge a response taking into account the location and shape of a crowd. Heirich (1971) indicates that when Savio spoke on the rooftop of the police car, the capture became a focused rally. Since it became a focused rally, are we to assume that the crowd was circular around the police car since " . . . circularity . . . permits the most efficient arrangement of individuals around a common point of focus" (Milgram and

Toch, 1965:518)? May (1965) indicates that the political makeup of the Berkeley campus can be characterized by a circle with radical leadership at the center, a large semi-student population at the fringe and in between, a shifting, potentially active mass. When one examines the formation of the students around the car, we may also be able to identify a shape somewhat consistent with the above which, in turn, would provide information on the crowd.

There were two specific references to the crowd shape, as indicated by Draper (1965). "There were perhaps 300 sitting down now, in an irregular free form area around the car . . . . The crowd was a solid wall circling this theatre-in-the-round" and also, "The irregular outline of the sit-down area extended a pseudopod closer to the police fortress . . ." (Draper, 1965:55;56). This indicates something about the crowd shape but does not consider the implications. More frequently, there were descriptions such as " . . . the crowd seemed to extend as far as the eye could see in every direction around the car, a few thousand in number" (Draper, 1965:42), and "At 11:15 p.m., small groups of anti-demonstration demonstrators began converging on the mall from all directions swelling the crowd to about 2500" (Editors of the California Monthly, 1965:113).

Crowd Boundaries. Again, there was little information concerning the boundary of the crowd, which includes permeability and sharpness. The literature indicates that a serious conflict arose when anti-demonstration demonstrators went over to the sit-in around the police car. At this time, there were also police stationed around the area. As Draper (1965:44) indicates, "Estimates of the 'Greek' contigent run from 100-200 . . . but this was more than enough if the aim was to touch off a riot in order to involve the police." It is proposed that a systematic examination of the crowd boundaries and how they were maintained would yield considerable information as to why a riot did not develop. Heirich (1971:166) gives some indication of the boundary of the crowd when he states:

> They quickly encountered a wall of people standing on the edge of the demonstration; the new arrivals spilled around toward Sproul Hall, climbing the steps and forming a half-moon to the east of the police car demonstration. They did not try to enter the area occupied by the seated demonstrators.

In terms of the sharpness of the boundary, Heirich (1971) also indicates a code which signals that if one was standing, he was merely a watcher, but if one was sitting, he was an active participant.

Finally, in terms of the permeability of the crowd, the Editors of the California Monthly (1965:117) note that, " . . . as six campus police officers penetrated the periphery of the crowd--in an effort to reinforce the stranded police car--the demonstrators packed themselves solidly around the car." Although, the word "packed" does not yield considerable information, it would seem that the permeability of the crowd was low.

Besides Heirich's (1971) description of the code, there seemed to be no distinction made in terms of numbers and boundaries of those who were active participants and those who were simply onlookers and/or sympathizers.

Individuals or Groups in Collective Behavior. There is considerable support indicating that it was mainly groups involved in the events of October 1-2. A survey conducted by Lyons (Heirich, 1971:213) of 618 persons who had participated in the demonstration around the police car indicates that "More than 75% knew at least four other demonstrators before the incident . . . only about one person in twenty joined without knowing anyone else on the scene." A survey of Berkeley students, by Kathleen Gales in 1965, also supports this contention (Heirich, 1971). This implies that friendship ties were present during the incident.

Crowd Size. The issue of crowd size has been dealt with in previous sections. I would now like to bring in an overview of the consistency of the reports. Heirich (1971:28) indicates that "The number of persons in an area and their dispersion affect the chance that an unusual act will be widely noted." He goes on further to discuss aspects of crowd size in relation to other aspects of crowd behavior. The actual number of people present in a given situation are very important, but often reports are not consistent across the literature. In terms of October 1-2, the literature was fairly consistent in regard to the number of persons present. However, often the size was ambiguously described as "hundreds" or "thousands," and for the most part, the estimates did not distinguish between those actually sitting and those just standing.

To begin with, the Editors of the California Monthly (1965:111) estimate that at noon there were 300 persons, while one half hour later, there were " . . . several thousand students . . . . " around the car. Draper (1965) estimates a couple of hundred sitting but a few thousand persons actually there a few minutes past 12 p.m. At approximately 2:30 p.m., the range of estimates of those entering Sproul Hall is 150-200 (Draper, 1965; Editors of the California Monthly, 1965). All reports agree that at 4 p.m., there were 400 students actually in Sproul Hall. At 6:15 p.m., when police attempted to close Sproul Hall doors, the Editors of the California Monthly (1965) estimated 2000 persons in the Plaza, of which 100 charged the police. The number of anti-demonstration demonstrators reported was 500 (Editors of the _California Monthly_, 1965), while Draper (1965) noted 100 "Greeks," but acknowledged that other estimates range from 100-200.

It was estimated that approximately 200 persons spent the night around the car, although this was the only size reported in the literature (Draper, 1965). The only other estimates available for the crowd size note that at 12 p.m., October 2, there were 400 persons on the Plaza, which increased to 7000 at 5:30 p.m. (Editors of the _California Monthly_, 1965). Draper (1965)indicates that at 5:30 p.m., there were 300 persons actually sitting and that number increased to 500 by 6:30 p.m.

The number of police reported in the area varies. The Editors of the _California Monthly_ (1965) and Heirich (1971) estimated 500 policemen, including 100 motorcycle policemen, while Miller and Gilmore (1965) leave the number ambiguously at "several hundred." Draper (1965:54) indicates that "The official word was that there were 450-500 police, but only _The San Fransico Examiner_ (Hearst) reporters made a physical count and they reported almost a thousand--965 to be exact."

In sum, the number of persons present varied according to what aspect of the crowd one was reporting and at what time. And again, many of the estimates did not distinguish between those sitting and those only there to watch.

_Participant Characteristics_. This was one of the most extensively covered issues, as was true with Kent State University. The characteristics of participants can usually be obtained fairly accurately after the event.

One point that I would like to bring up is that, as with Kent State, there were direct references to a communist and "Castroite and Maoist" agitators behind the student protest. Most of the literature refuted this, but not all (cf. Draper, 1965; Glazer, 1970; Hook, 1970; Lipset, 1965; Miller, 1965; Peterson, 1965; Searle, 1965; Somers, 1965; Stern, 1965).

In terms of systematic research, extensive survey data were gathered on the participants. The results are too numerous to cover adequately here; therefore, I will give a brief overview of the content of these. Lyons (1965) prepared a questionaire dealing specifically with the police car demonstration participants. This survey (Lyons, 1965:525) indicated that "Generally, the demonstrators seem to be more liberal politically and to live in less restrictive housing than the total University population." Lyons (1965:525) further noted that the demonstrator " . . . generally falls into the academic intellectual and the non-conformist intellectual groups . . . . "

There was also a random survey conducted by Somers (1965:532) which summarizes the total University population and then compares " . . . the difference between students who took opposing sides in the controversy." Again, the results are too numerous to adequately cover here; therefore, only a portion of the results is presented. Among the various issues the survey examined were satisfaction with the University in which at least 82% of those sampled reported themselves as satisfied or very satisfied, and also, 34% of the total sample were generally in favor of the tactics of the demonstrators. At least one-third of the students felt that once the demonstration of October 2 got underway, the action of the administration toward the demonstrators was not in good faith. Somers

(1965:538) further indicates that in terms of sympathy for the demonstrators, " . . . there was widespread sympathy on campus for the demonstrators, sufficient to tolerate, although not without criticism, the tactics they used."

The total sample was then broken down into categories of militants, moderates and conservatives, respectively those who were for both the tactics and goals of the demonstrators, those who supported the goals but not the tactics, and those who were both against the goals and tactics (Somers, 1965). Somers' (1965) analysis of the results suggests that two-thirds of the militants classified themselves as either liberal democrats or independents, while approximately three-fifths of the conservatives were comprised of equal numbers of conservative Republicans, liberal Republicans, and independents. Finally, in terms of major field of concentration and support for the FSM, the social science, humanities and physical science majors accounted for three-fourths of the identified militants. This is in contrast to approximately one-third of the conservatives who reported as being in these majors. This survey is frequently cited in literature dealing with Berkeley.

Another well-documented survey of the characteristics of the participants was that done by Kathleen Gales and then reanalyzed by Heirich (Heirich, 1971). A summary of the data (Heirich, 1971:207) indicates,

> Thus such personal variables as age, sex, political background, or attitudes toward one's family offer little help in predicting who will take part in these ventures. In striking contrast, such immediate situational variables as length of time on the Berkeley campus, place of campus residence, and major subject of study work very well to predict who will become involved.

As an example, both Somers' and Gales' data indicate a difference in sympathetic attitude toward the FSM, with women more sympathetic, but there is no difference in the proportion of those who acted (Heirich, 1972).

There were numerous surveys about the participants throughout the conflict in the last months of 1964 at Berkeley, e.g., Katz's survey of 62 students who were arrested during the December 3 sit-in (for more extensive coverage of the surveys which took place, the reader is advised to turn to the following sources: Heirich, 1971; Katz, 1968; Lipset and Wolin, 1965; Miller and Gilmore, 1965).

In terms of qualitative interpretations of the characteristics of the participants, Miller (1965:53) indicates three rough categories of student supporters:

> Some students derive gratification and a sense of meaning from their involvement in politics . . . . Another segment of the student body constitutes, more or less, a community of self pity. It is made up mostly of older undergrads and a few beginning graduate students who have sulked through their years at Berkeley in a pose of militant sensitivity.
>
> My impression is that the revolt drew its leaders and its most vocal and committed supporters mainly from these two groups. With the final group, the vast mass of sympathizers who signed petitions, swelled the ranks of sit-ins, or went on strike, alienation is not so much the issue . . . .

This is only one example of the various nonsurvey-type characterizations. Often, neither surveys nor nonsurveys take account of nonstudent participation, of which one estimate was ten percent (Hook, 1965).

It is sufficient to indicate that this element of collective behavior, participant characteristics, is one of the most extensively covered, probably due to the ease with which this type of data can be generated.

In conclusion, Heirich (1971:65), in discussing the various results of the surveys, makes a very important point:

> . . . these structural pushes toward a liberal-to-radical political _outlook_ for some of the students did not make what occurred inevitable. Possession of a generalized _attitude_ does not necessarily lead persons to _act_ in terms of it. The effect of these influences, rather, was to create an increasingly large reservoir of students living near the campus who possessed sentiments generally sympathetic to the goals of radical political actions and who were structurally unimpeded (by problems of schedule coordination or sanctions thatcould be imposed by other persons) from joining in such action if they wished to do so.

Therefore, it is not enough to just examine participant characteristics, one must also take account of the other elementary features of collective behavior in order to examine crowd behavior.

_Crowd Movement_. McPhail (1972) has argued that not enough attention is paid to the formation and dispersal of crowds. This statement is supported by the review of the literature concerning Berkeley on October 1-2. Statements such as " . . . students spontaneously formed a sit-in . . . . " and "The crowd broke up when the University agreed not to press charges . . . . " do not tell us anything about the crowd but were frequently used throughout the analysis. There were many times during the 32 hours in which an analysis of the above features was warranted. For example, at 7:30 p.m., when Savio publicly announced the agreement and asked the demonstrators to leave, statements such as " . . . the students were dispersing" (Editors of the _California Monthly_, 1965:118) are the norm rather than the exception.

Heirich's (1971:148) analysis, using tapes from KPFA radio, allowed one to gauge the length of time betwwen episodes; for example,

> Burton White (into the microphone): "And now the entire group, bit by bit, seems to be sitting. (This announcement comes 40 seconds after the statement that there are a dozen persons in front and fifteen behind the car). The group which before was a dozen in front has become some 50, 75."

But this does not indicate other important features of the movement of the crowd (e.g. convergence on a common time-space location) and is open to the subjective interpretation of the reporter. For example, at the point when the anti-demonstrators left, Heirich (1971:174) indicates, "A minute later, the announcer reports that the loudest group has left for the corner of Bancroft and Telegraph." This gives no indication of the dispersal of this group, nor does, "It was not long before the whole platoon slunk away" (Draper, 1965:45).

The actual movement of the crowd was also neglected at the time when Savio requested some of the demonstrators to join him in Sproul Hall. The reports only indicate that "Savio then led about 150 students into Sproul Hall, where they sat outside the office of the dean of students" (Heirich, 1971:172). And one report (Hook, 1970:87) notes, "Additional protestors stormed into Sproul Hall for another sit-in." There is quite a difference between the words "led" and "stormed." Also, questions can be raised such as in which area of the demonstrators around the car did those who joined Savio come from, and how was this movement facilitated? Information of this type, concerning crowd movement, will allow researchers to pinpoint specific actions rather than generalizing the actions of some of the crowd to those of the crowd as a whole.

## SUMMARY

In terms of the elementary features of collective behavior with regard to the Berkeley FSM, one finds a general lack of information concerning these features. But this need not be the case, as was shown with Heirich's (1971) analysis which presented an examination of the event consistent with the elementary features of collective behavior. However, there still remains considerable work to be done.

In sum, the majority of the literature that dealt directly with the events of Berkeley did so in a superficial manner. In fact, most of the works dealt only with a biased interpretation of the ideological and moral issues that were then applied to the events and the participants. From examining the literature, we remain unenlightened regarding the actions of the crowd, *per se*. For instance, the following represents two accounts of the Berkeley FSM: one report, citing the incidents of October 1-2, came to the conclusion that "Obviously the leaders of the FSM were guilty of riot in preventing an arrest of an individual charged with breaking the law" (Hook, 1970:189), while a second report indicates that "There were no riots. Save for the incident of the 'captured' police car, the mass rallies, sit-ins, and the student strike were all conducted with admirable dignity and calm." (Wolin and Schaar, 1965:363).

It is therefore proposed that, by an examination of the elementary features of collective behavior, these could lend empirical support to either of the above statements, thereby coming to more critical conclusions regarding the events.

The next chapter will consist of a synthesis of the information obtained in this and the preceding chapters. Specifically, the task of this thesis will be reiterated, including what was actually done, and what further information this generated, and finally, an assessment and overall conclusion regarding future research in collective behavior.

## CHAPTER V

## CONCLUDING REMARKS

### DISCUSSION

Many researchers (e.g., Fisher, 1972; Milgram and Toch, 1965; McPhail, 1972; Weller and Quarentelli, 1973; et al.) have argued that as a field of study, collective behavior lacks important theoretical and methodological knowledge. This tends to be mutually reinforcing in that theoretical perspectives offer guidelines to gathering empirical data concerning collective behavior phenomena, and, in turn, empirical data are used to assess and provide support for theoretical notions.

The present theoretical inadequacies, it has been argued, include such problems as a failure to determine the theoretical boundaries of collective behavior, the lack of theoretical clarity which results in limited empirical knowledge, a failure to advance clear variables, and a lack of definition of collective behavior. Researchers, as such, lack specific categories of observable behavior to direct their attention to the issue of what to look for and where. Many authors attempt to establish a reasoning for why an event occurred without previously attempting a systematic and detailed description and analysis of what actually happened.

It has been proposed that the "why" of what happened cannot be adequately explained in the absence of empirical data on certain essential features. This directs our attention to the issue of clear variables and concepts. Much of the behavior of crowds has been described in generalities, metaphors, and emotion-laden terminology. This has often been due to the biases of authors and also because we lack a systematic analysis of the methods of the crowd. Pickens (1975:25) has argued quite reasonably that " . . . collective behavior lacks an established terminology with which to differentiate, define, and identify its objects of investigation." To deal with this problem, in this thesis, there have been eight suggested elementary features of collective behavior. It has been proposed that these eight elements are essential for a systematic analysis of what is the least attended stage in regard to collective behavior phenomenon, specifically, the middle stage. By attending to these features, we may be better able to generate essential empirical data on the crowd *per se*, thereby achieving a more comprehensive understanding of collective behavior phenomenon and resolving some of the previously cited problems, both theoretical and methodological, involved in the analysis of collective behavior.

Therefore, the task of this thesis is an attempt to analyze variables which researchers argue have been traditionally ignored in studies of collective behavior phenomena. These elements, it is proposed, are necessary for an accurate description of the phenomena to be explained and consequently, for that explanation.

In sum, the problems surrounding theoretical and methodological issues must be brought " . . . to a level at which measurement, controlled observation, and imaginative experiments can begin to play some part in choosing among competing views" (Milgram and Toch, 1965:584). It is suggested here that attending to the elementary features of collective behavior is conducive to the aims cited above.

SUMMARY OF THE DESIGN

To carry out the intentions of this thesis, two events were chosen for analysis, the Berkeley Free Speech Movement in 1964, and Kent State University in May, 1970. It is granted that these events occurred prior to the existing body of literature which argues for a more systematic analysis and description of such events. The basis for choosing these two events is that there is an extensive amount of literature concerning them, and also, they were well attended by social scientists. The most immediate concern of this thesis was to examine and evaluate a key episode of collective behavior within each event using the suggested elementary features of collective behavior. An evaluation of the events, I proposed, would indicate what we did and what we did well; what needs to be done in the future; and finally, what can and cannot be dealt with adequately. In sum, if we attended to gathering information of the type suggested in this thesis, would we be better able to empirically evaluate the occurrence of collective behavior?

To begin with, a summary of the events prior to the chosen situation was considered as the origins or background. Secondly, a somewhat more detailed description was given of the event that was chosen for further analysis in light of the elementary features of collective behavior. Finally, the outcomes subsequent to the key dates were reviewed. In the case of Berkeley, since the chosen day for review was at an early point of the Free Speech Movement, the events of collective action following this date were numerous and therefore, covered more extensively. The key difference in the amount of time spent on outcomes stems from the fact that the Berkeley Free Speech Movement is considered a social movement, whereas the events at Kent State University were regarded as a series of episodic outbursts.

The rationale for choosing a certain event is given elsewhere, but in sum, these events seemed most conducive to an analysis, with regard to the elementary features of collective behavior proposed.

In the final sections of Chapters III and IV, the literature was assessed regarding these events, taking into consideration the suggested elementary features of collective behavior. The specific information that I attempted to gather was, were these features attended to in the literature, and if so, how well was this done. A summary is then provided of where research, addressing the crowd _per se_, stood at that particular time.

## SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS

A summary of the findings indicates that the elementary features of collective behavior which I addressed were neglected in the literature. One of the most extensively covered elements or variables was that of participant characteristics. As stated before, this type of data can be more easily obtained after the event and therefore, should be more systematically covered. But it should be noted that "Measures of attitude and personality . . . as well as socioeconomic and demographic attributes have yielded consistently low correlations with behavior" (McPhail, 1972: 11). Therefore, we cannot depend solely on this information to yield a comprehensive analysis of the crowd.

The physical conditions created by dense aggregates of people, crowd shape, crowd boundaries, and crowd movement, as defined and discussed in Chapter II, were the most neglected characteristics in both of the events.

When covered at all, these elements were consistently defined ambiguously by generalizations and metaphors.

There was often considerable inconsistency in reporting crowd size at Kent State University, while at Berkeley, the range of estimates was more consistent, but often given at different times, thereby making comparisons difficult.

Leadership was not well attended to at Kent State University, while at Berkeley, there was considerable discussion of the leaders of the FSM, though there was no distinction made between the entire course of the events and the events of October 1-2. Most reports of Kent State University indicate no formal leadership, but the question to be raised is, how do we know leadership when it is present?

Finally, in terms of individuals or groups in collective behavior, the literature dealing with Kent State University has very little on this element. Of the reports that do deal with this feature, there is no real agreement as to who went as individuals and who went with one or more persons. The evidence for Berkeley more strongly suggests that the crowd was made up of people with friendship ties and not isolated individuals. In fact, a survey of participants in the capture of the police car conducted by Lyons (Heirich, 1965:213) indicates that "More than 75% knew at least four other demonstrators before the incident . . . . "

In sum, there seems to be a valid argument that we have little theoretical or methodological knowledge pertaining to the crowd and collective behavior phenomena in general.

ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Given that the main body of literature arguing for an empirical analysis of the suggested variables occurred after the events that were analyzed happened, could this information have been obtained? I think the answer to this is yes. The events that were analyzed were attention-getting by both the media and social scientists. Furthermore, in both events, the participants gave direct information that the rallies were to take place at a specific time and place.

The events of collective behavior that occurred October 1-2 at Berkeley lasted 32 hours, were fairly well organized, and therefore, were very available to an examination of such features as crowd size, crowd boundaries, and crowd movement. Although the events of Kent State University on May 4, 1970, were of a shorter duration, there were many photographs taken which could have aided researchers. In fact, many social scientists (e.g., Berk, 1972; Fisher, 1972; McPhail, 1972; McPhail and Wohlstein, 1983; Milgram and Toch, 1965; Pickens, 1975; Wohlstein, 1977) have advanced strategies to deal with the observation of collective behavior when conditions such as a short time-span exist. Furthermore, these strategies can be equally applied to episodes which last considerably longer, such as the Berkeley Free Speech Movemnt. Therefore, techniques which presently exist have reduced some of the problems associated with the analysis of episodes of collective behavior.

Given the availability of various techniques which minimize many of the problems associated with research, this still leaves open the issue of what students of collective behavior should be looking at. Many questions and criticisms have been generated in this thesis by a review of the literature in light of the elementary features of collective behavior. But, the question still remains: would it have made a difference if we had attended to gathering information of the type suggested in this thesis?

Researchers, at the point in time these events took place, made an inquiry into collective behavior on a level at which general information could be given concerning the crowd and its participants. It is the argument of this thesis that what needs to be done in the future is to get away from examining the crowd and its participants only in terms of this general observation. Instead, research should be brought to a level at which analysis includes the examination of crowd characteristics, i.e., the crowd as a phenomenon to be studied independent of its purpose, setting, and individual participants. Researchers have typically started from the point of view that, given a collection of people, why have they gathered and what happened. It is the contention of this thesis that an analysis of collective behavior must begin with the crowd, *per se*. The crowd is something that is empirically distinct from the characteristics of the participants, and more than the sum of its parts. Much of the research that was examined in this thesis, dealing with Kent State University and the Berkeley Free Speech Movement, continually focused on the contributions of individuals or groups of individuals to explain what happened and why it happened. But the crowd, as an entity, does exhibit characteristics which can be systematically analyzed and these characteristics include boundary, shape, and size. The elementary features of collective behavior can suggest some patterned regularities that exist in crowds, irrespective of their specific location and purpose.

Furthermore, it is suggested that unless these dimensions are given attention, this "why" of what happened, in terms of the event and its outcome(s), cannot be explained. The role of individuals in crowd behavior and their characteristics are important, but are limited in their usefulness to empirically explain crowd phenomena.

In this thesis, it has been shown that the elementary features of collective behavior, for the most part, are not well attended. What is needed to resolve this situation includes not only more precise articulation of what is going on, but also, more importantly, a shift in the standard used to analyze episodes of collective behavior, a new basis in which to begin research of the phenomena termed collective behavior. This standard involves an emphasis on the previously cited elementary features of collective behavior.

One of the implications of conducting research on the elementary features of collective behavior consists in a more comprehensive view of the crowd and the participants and also with regard to prediction of phenomena. This, in turn, can lead to an enhanced and well-thought-out theoretical perspective within the field of collective behavior. In this thesis, I have dealt mainly with the methodological issues involved in analysis. But the methodological issues are not divorced from a well-thought-out theoretical scheme. It is suggested that theoretical attention to the elementary features of collective behavior would provide what is necessary to understand and explain collective behavior phenomena.

Another implication of conducting research utilizing these features is that what produces violence may be found in these dimensions. If these features were given systematic attention, students of collective behavior may be better able to predict when violence will occur, and the form and content it might take.

Two events were chosen for systematic analysis in this thesis. Kent State University, on May 4, 1970, resulted in violence and the death of four students, whereas at Berkeley, on October 1-2, 1964, violent confrontations did not take place, although the situational facilities seemed conducive to such an occurrence. The question that can be raised is why did one event produce violence and not the other? In fact, why do some events or episodes of collective behavior result in certain types of activities and others do not? It is proposed that an application of the elementary features of collective behavior to analyses of events of collective behavior will provide a starting point in which to answer the above questions.

A systematic and empirical analysis of events in light of the previously mentioned variables may enable social scientists to explain what occurred and why it occurred. Over the long run, with continued emphasis in this area, stronger conclusions can be arrived at. For example, knowing that if a number of these features are present, a certain outcome will result. This will enable researchers to not only predict but to explain. This information is of particular importance when incidents of collective behavior result in violence. For instance, crowd boundaries are extremely important. When two hostile groups clash, it is largely a boundary confrontation. This can then be analyzed in terms of crowd interpenetration. Furthermore, agents of social control may be better able to anticipate and gauge an appropriate response to a given situation when increased knowledge of the crowd, *per se*, is gathered. Therefore, an analysis on this level not only has empirical possibilities, but is also of practical importance to possibly reduce unnecessary violence between crowds and agents of social control. Again, when one considers crowd boundaries, which includes the aspect of permeability, agents of social control may be better prepared to align themselves in relation to the crowd and to judge when direct action is warranted and when it is not.

In conclusion, future research must consider the eight cited elementary features of collective behavior which have been termed essential building blocks for pursuing an understanding of such events. The present literature on the events involved at Kent State University on May 4, 1970 and Berkeley on October 1-2, 1964, do not tell us all we need to know to establish what are the social properties of collective behavior. To answer questions such as, how are crowds similar or different and does this produce differences in degrees of violence, students of collective behavior must be able to transcend the specific purpose or setting in which crowd behavior is taking place. The elementary features of collective behavior can be applied to any type of crowd and crowd behavior, and therefore, can help to resolve some of the problems of what to look for and where. This, in turn, can lead to an enhanced theoretical perspective by providing information on recurrent behavior patterns of crowds. The crowd must be what is studied and not limited simply to where things are studied (Milgram and Toch, 1965).

By giving theoretical and methodological attention to the elementary features of collective behavior, researchers can begin to investigate with more clarity the phenomena we generically term collective behavior.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY


Adamek, R.J. and J.M. Lewis
1973 "Social Control Violence and Radicalization: The Kent State Case." Social Forces 51:341-47.

Aveni, A.F.
1977 "The Not-So-Lonely Crowd: Friendship Groups in Collective Behavior." Sociometry 40:96-9.

Bell, D. and I. Kristol
1969 Confrontation: The Student Rebellion and the Universities. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Berk, R.
1972 "The Controversy Surrounding Analysis of Collective Violence: Some Methodological Notes," in J. Short and M. Wolfgang (eds.), Collective Violence. Chicago: Aldine.

1974 Collective Behavior. Dubuque, Ia.: W.C. Brown.

Best, J. J.
1981 "The Tragic Weekend of May 1 to 4, 1970," in T.R. Hensley (ed.), The Kent State Incident. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Davies, P.
1973 The Truth about Kent State, A Challenge to the American Conscience. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux.

Draper, H.
1965 Berkeley: The New Student Revolt. New York: Grove Press, Inc.

Editors of the California Monthly
1965 "Chronology of Events: Three Months of Crisis," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

Eszterhas, J. and M.D. Roberts
1970 Thirteen Seconds: Confrontation at Kent State. New York: Dodd, Mead.

Fisher, C.S.
1972 "Observing a Crowd: The Structure and Description of Protest Demonstrations," in J. Douglas (ed.), Research on Deviance. New York: Random House.

Fitch, R.E.
1965 "Extremism in the Defense of . . . . ," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

Foster, J.
1970 "Student Protest: What is Known, What is Said," in J. Foster and D. Long (eds.), Protest! Student Activism in America. New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc.

Foster, J. and D. Long
1970 Protest! Student Activism in America. New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc.

Glazer, N.
1970 Remembering the Answers. New York: Basic Books, Inc.

Heirich, M.
1971 The Spiral of Conflict. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hensley, T.R. and J.M. Lewis
1978 Kent State and May 4th. A Social Science Perspective. Iowa: Kendall/Hunt.

Hook, S.
1965 "Academic Freedom and the Rights of Students," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

1970 Academic Freedom and Academic Anarchy. New York: Cowles Book Company, Inc.

Katz, J. and Associates
1970 No Time For Youth. San Fransico: Jossey-Bass, Inc.

Kelner, J. and J. Munves
1980 The Kent State Coverup. New York: Harper and Row.

Krassner, P.
1965 "The Naked Emperor," in M.V. Miller and S. Gilmore (eds.), Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.

Lewis, J. M.
1978 "A Study of the Kent State Incident Using Smelser's Theory of Collective Behavior," in T.R. Hensley and J.M. Lewis (eds.), Kent State and May 4th. A Social Science Perspective. Iowa: Kendall/ Hunt.

Lipset, S.M. and S.S. Wolin
1965 The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

Lipset, S.M. and G.M. Schaflander
1971 Passion and Politics: Student Activism in America. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company.

Lyons, G.
1965 "The Police Car Demonstration: A Survey of Participants," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

Moreno, J.L.
1934 Who Shall Survive? Washington, D.C.: Nervous & Mental Diseases Publishing Co.

Marine, G.
1965 "No Fair! The Students Strike at California," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

May, H.
1965 "The Student Movement at Berkeley: Some Impressions," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

McCarthy, J. and M. Zald
1973 The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Corp.

McPhail, C.
1972 Theoretical and Methodological Strategies for the Study of Individual and Collective Behavior Sequences. Presented at Ann. Meet. Am. Sociolol. Assoc.: New Orleans.

McPhail, C. and R.T. Wohlstein
1982 "Using Film to Analyze Pedestrian Behavior." Sociological Methods and Research 10:347-375.

Meyer, K. and J. Seidler
1978 "The Structure of Gatherings." Sociology and Social Research 63:131-153.

Milgram, S. and H. Toch
1965 "Collective Behavior: Crowds and Social Movements," in G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology Vol. IV. Mass.: Addison-Wesley.

Miller, M.V.
1965 "The Student State of Mind," in M.V. Miller and S. Gilmore (eds.), Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.

Miller, M.V. and S. Gilmore
1965 Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.

Perry, J.B., Jr. and M. Pugh
1978 Collective Behavior: Response to Social Stress. U.S.: West Pub.

Peterson, W.
1965 "What is left at Berkeley," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

Pickens, R.G.
1975 "The Explananda of Collective Behavior." Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Raskin, A.H.
1965 "The Berkeley Affair: Mr. Kerr vs. Mr. Savio & Co.," in M.V. Miller and S. Gilmore (eds.), Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.

Sale, K.
1973 SDS. New York: Random House.

Scranton Commission Report
1970 U.S. President's Commission on Campus Unrest. Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Searle, J.
1965 "The Faculty Resolution," in M.V. Miller and S. Gilmore (eds.), Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.

Skolnick, J.H.
1969 The Politics of Protest. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Somers, R.H.
1965 "The Mainsprings of the Rebellion: A Survey of Berkeley Students in November 1964," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.

Spence, L.D.
1965 "Berkeley: What it Demonstrates," in M.V. Miller and S. Gilmore (eds.), Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell Publishing Co., Inc.

Stern, S.
1965 "A Deeper Disenchantment," in M.V. Miller and S. Gilmore (eds), Revolution at Berkeley. New York: Dell Publishing Company.

Sullivan, T.J.
1977 "The 'Critical Mass' in Crowd Behavior: Crowd Size, Contagion and the Evolution of Riots." Humboldt Journal of Social Relations 4:46-59.

Taylor, S., R. Shuntich, P. McGovern and R. Genthner
1971 Violence at Kent State, May 1-4, 1970: The Students' Perspective. New York: College Notes and Texts.

Warshaw, S.
1965 The Trouble in Berkeley. California: Diablo Press.

Weller, J.M. and E.L. Quarentelli
1973 "Neglected Characteristics of Collective Behavior." American Journal of Sociology 79:665-685.

Wohlstein, R.T.
1977 "Filming Collective Behavior and the Problem of Foreshortened Perspective: A Corrective Method." Studies in the Anthropology of Visual Communication 4:81-5.

Wolin, S.S. And J.H. Schaar
1965 "The Abuses of the Multiversity," in S.M. Lipset and S.S. Wolin (eds.), The Berkeley Student Revolt. New York: Doubleday.